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Broderick: Preferential Admissions and the Brown Heritage

PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS AND
THE BROWN HERITAGE
ALBERT BRODERICK*

On September 16, 1976, the California Supreme Court held that the
special minority admissions program at a state university medical school
was invalid as a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 1 On February 22, 1977, the United States Supreme Court
agreed to grant review to the California Board of Regents. 2 So, once again,
the Court intimates that it will pass on the constitutionality of the voluntary
affirmative action programs that have been undertaken in recent years by
medical, law and other professional schools, as a means of inviting more
black and other minority persons into significant fields in which their
participation has been numerically low .
The Constitution, especially in its broad clauses, does not give a clear
answer to the complex problems which come before the courts for decision.
Often history does not disclose an obvious answer either. Still, unless the
United States Supreme Court is to be viewed as answering these difficult
questions in an ad hoc manner, it must attend to history, to precedent (how
it has interpreted that history) and to the constitutional principles behind its
precedents. The Court has been conscious of this responsibility, and of
being responsive to the place of policy in the "development" of constitutional doctrine. Its respect for continuity, and its awareness of the public and
professional disfavor that would accompany perception that its decisions
were predominantly ad hoc, have often led it to devise a methodology that
would bridge the development, and rationalize the emergence, of new rules
of constitutional decision. This pattern characterizes the Court's interpretation of the equal protection clause.
Lawyers, and the lower courts answerable to the United States Supreme
Court, have often treated woodenly both emerging precedents and the court* A.B. 1937, Princeton University; LL.B. 1941, S.J.D. 1963, Harvard University; D.
Phil. 1968, Oxford University; Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University.
1. Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal.3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976).
2. 430 U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 996 (1977). On November 15, 1976 the Supreme Court granted the
Regents "Application to stay execution and enforcement of mandate of the Supreme Court
of California (S.F. 23311) presented to Mr. Justice Rehnquist and by him referred to the Court
. . . for a period of thirty days." The Court's order added that "If a petition for a writ of
certiorari is filed within thirty days, this stay is to remain in effect pending disposition of the
case in this Court." 97 S. Ct. 373-374 (1976).
3. The Supreme Court's review, of course, only applies to public education. Minority
preference programs have extended beyond professional schools. The principles involved in
resolving the minority preference issues may be sufficiently broad for the result in Bakke to
envelop them all.
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approved methodology. When a tension develops between two lines of
constitutional doctrine, the tendency of many courts and lawyers is to see
one line alone as applicable, to the exclusion of the other. That this should
be done by lawyers is understandable. Counsel is given the result that his
client seeks to achieve and uses whatever constitutional resources are available to support this position. The motivation of the lower courts is more
complicated. Their chief aim, we may assume, is to formulate an opinion
that embodies the latest indications of the Supreme Court as to the applicable constitutional rule. In the apparently fresh case, where the Court's
indications are not clear, the courts may take refuge in the illusory "certainties" of an approved methodology. A lower court's opinion is unpersuasive
when it does not openly recognize that the case requires a choice, or a
reconciliation, between lines of competing constitutional principles.
Both these chronic shortcomings of lower court decisions-mechanical
use of constitutional formulas and dullness to competing policy lines-are
evident in the California courts' handling of the Bakke preferential admissions case. Although its result was diametrically opposite to Bakke, the
Washington courts fell into the same trap in DeFunis4-- the 1974 preferential admissions case which the Supreme Court dismissed on the ground of
5
mootness, without arriving at the merits.
The United States Supreme Court, on the one hand, does consider the
apparently conflicting constitutional principles in the fresh case. However,
it does not always articulate its choice, in the context of the specific case, of
one constitutional principle over the other. In fact, it often masks the choice
by stating its result in the deceptively neutral framework of its approved
methodology.
I. THE OUTLINE
I will suggest that in the preferential admissions case now before the
Court:
A.

There are Competing ConstitutionalPrinciples in Apparent Conflict
There was never any question that the thirteenth6 and fifteenth 7 amend-

4. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973). The facts in DeFunis are not
on "all fours" with Bakke. In DeFunis, a state law school was involved; in Bakke, a medical
school. In DeFunis, it appeared that plaintiff could have gotten his legal education elsewhere; in
Bakke, the California courts specifically found that plaintiff was "deprived" of medical
education by California's nonadmission-he was not accepted elsewhere. Nevertheless, for
purposes of full analysis it seems useful, and fair, to consider the two cases together.
5. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XV:
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ments were directed to the relief of the freed blacks; the thirteenth abolished
slavery, and the fifteenth prohibited racial discrimination in voting. There
should, perhaps, have been no question that the fourteenth amendment, 8
which specified that "no state shall deny to any person" "equal protection
of the law," "due process of law" or "privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States," was also conceived as affording protection primarily
to black citizens. The first decisions of the United States Supreme Court
interpreting this amendment took this position, in part perhaps, to avoid
enlarging national power at the expense of the states through an expansive
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. 9 From the beginning it was
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws ....
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
9. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). With reference to the thirteenth,
and fourteenth amendments, and the specific clauses "involuntary servitude", "privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States", "equal protection of the laws", and "due process
of law", the Court said:
The most cursory glance at these articles discloses a unity of purpose, when taken in
connection with the history of the times, which cannot fail to have an important bearing on
any question of doubt concerning their true meaning. Nor can such doubts, when any
reasonably exist, be safely and rationally solved without a reference to that history. ...
The institution of African slavery, as it existed in about half the states of the Union, and
the contests pervading the public mind for many years, between those who desired its
curtailment and ultimate extinction and those who desired additional safeguards for its
security and perpetuation, culminated in the effort, on the part of most of the states in
which slavery existed, to separate from the Federal government, and to resist its authority. This constituted the War of the Rebellion, and whatever auxiliary causes may have
contributed to bring about this war, undoubtedly the overshadowing and efficient cause
was African slavery.
In that struggle, slavery, as a legalized social relation, perished. It perished as a necessity
of the bitterness and force of the conflict . . . . Hence the thirteenth article of amendment of that instrument.
With reference to the 1st section of the fourteenth amendment, defining citizenship, the Court
said: "That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no
doubt."
With reference to the "due process" clause, the Court was content to recall that a comparable clause had existed from the beginning, in the fifth amendment, and to state that the addition
of the clause to the fourteenth amendment places "the restraining power over the states in this
matter in the hands of the Federal government."
The Court then considered the applicability of the "equal protection" clause in these words:
In the light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading purpose of them,
which we have already discussed, it is not difficult to give a meaning to this clause. The
existence of laws in the states where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which
discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be
remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.
The Court then considered the scope of the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment:

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1977

3

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1977], Art. 2
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
If, however, the States did not conform their laws to its requirements, then by the fifth
section of the article of amendment Congress was authorized to enforce it by suitable
legislation. We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held
to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and
that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.
The Court then explained the fifteenth amendment as similarly motivated, on the conviction
that blacks "living in the midst of another and dominant race, could never be fully secured in
their person and their property without the right of suffrage."
Finally, the Court considered all three amendments as an entirety:
• . . [N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all,
lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been even
suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of
that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It is true that
only the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by speaking of his color and
his slavery. But it is just as true that each of the other articles was addressed to the
grievances of that race, and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth.
The Court then concedes the overflow of the protections of the amendments to others than
blacks, at the same time keeping a special eye on the purposes it had just discussed:
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection. Both the
language and spirit of these articles are to have their fair and just weight in any question of
construction. Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress
which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or
hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of
the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to
make it void. And so if other rights are assailed by the States which properly and
necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that protection will apply, though
the party interested may not be of African descent. But what we do say, and what we wish
to be understood is, that in any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these
amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said was the pervading
spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed to remedy, and the process of
continued addition to the Constitution, until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can accomplish it.
In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), with reference to the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments, the Court said:
One great purpose of these Amendments was to raise the colored race from that
condition of inferiority and servitude in which most of them had previously stood into
perfect equality of civil rights with all other persons within the jurisdiction of the States.
They were intended to take away all possibility of oppression by law because of race or
color.
With reference to the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of the fourteenth
amendment, the court recognized applicability to "all persons":
But the constitutional amendment was ordained for a purpose. It was to secure equal
rights to all persons, and, to insure to all persons the enjoyment of such rights, power was
given to Congress to enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation.
In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), the Court adhered to its dual position
concerning the Civil War Amendments-that they were designed primarily for the black race,
but that they had coverage for all. After repeating the above assertions from Slaughter-House,
the Court said:
It was in view of these considerations the Fourteenth Amendment was framed and
adopted. It was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights
that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of
the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States
If this is the spirit and meaning of the amendment, whether it means more or not, it is to
be construed liberally, to carry out the purposes of its framers.
The Court concedes the applicability of the fourteenth amendment to non-blacks (in a
passage quoted supra). But it stresses the racial discrimination at which the amendment is
principally directed, and suggests limitations on its extension beyond concerns of protecting
and aiding the emancipated black citizens, in full enjoyment of that citizenship:
[Among the guarantees of the amendment are] the right to exemption from unfriendly
legislation against them distinctively as colored, -- exemption from legal discriminations,
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clear, of course, that "any person" came within the protection of the
amendment. But the first cases foresaw a greater ambit of protection when
the "person" in question was complaining of discrimination based on race.
The waning, and subsequent revival, of the protection given racial claims
will be discussed further. For the moment, it is sufficient to identify this
"race" principle, or line, of fourteenth amendment interpretation.
I suggest a competing line of interpretation, which concerns coverage by
the fourteenth amendment of nonracial matters, that I shall call the "any
person" principle. After the limited scope given this principle at first, there
was an extensive use made of it, particularly in economic matters, from
about 1890 to 1937; it largely centered on what came to be called "substantive" or "economic" "due process." This phase was terminated with the
coming of the Roosevelt Court, in 1938-40. But in the ensuing three
decades, the "any person" line took on new importance-in matters of
"procedural due process," in a new "substantive due process" concerning
the first amendment ° and other "fundamental" personal rights, and in an
expanded use of the "equal protection" clause.
The "preferential minority admissions" question is not rooted in the
fourteenth amendment; it concerns voluntary, not compelled, ameliorative
action by a state. But because it is remedial, it is suggestive of the "race
line," particularly close to the expansive "race line" that has been prevalent since Brown v. Board of Education was decided in 1954.11 The
challenge of plaintiff Bakke is, of course, clearly in the "any person"
line. 2 The apparent conflict of the two lines emerges here, because in
implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights
which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the
condition of a subject race. .
. The very fact that colored people are singled out and
expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as
jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully
qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to
individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others ...
[Still] . . . a State may . . .prescribe the qualifications of its jurors, and in so doing

make [nonracial] discriminations. It may confine the selection to males, to freeholders, to
citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons having educational qualifications.
We do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit this. Looking
at its history, it is clear it had no such purpose. Its aim was against discrimination because
of race or color. As we have said more than once, its design was to protect an emancipated
race, and to strike down all possible legal discriminations against those who belong to
it. .. .

It must not be intimated that, overall, Slaughter-House was favorable to blacks. In fact, it laid
the groundwork for the repressive Civil Rights Cases, ten years later. One of the measuring
rods of the Court's backsliding, in the 1873-1883 decade, is the shift in views of Justice Bradley.
Compare his dissent in Slaughter-House with his opinion for the Court in the Civil Rights
Cases.
10. The first amendment's development commenced in 1925, with Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925). The succeeding first amendment cases are cited at note 115 infra.
1I. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It is a theme of this study that this case launched an "era"--one of
the proudest in the history of the Court.
12. I am suggesting that the long debate as to the "meaning" of fourteenth amendment due
process was more basically a question of the extensiveness of the "any person", nonracial
category, as I am calling it. The privileges and immunities clause was long nullified, and the
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pursuing his "any person"1 3 claim Bakke seeks the benefit of the race-as-a"suspect class" doctrine. Despite earlier antecedents, "suspect class"
was first forged into a powerful weapon in the hospitable-to-the-race-line
era of Brown.
The Conflict is Apparent, Rather Than Real
The suggestion under this heading is that since Brown, the "suspect
class" doctrine, with occasional exceptions, has developed as an integral
part of the Court's consistent espousal of the "race line," almost as a
"preferred position" in fourteenth amendment interpretation. Comparably
strong support for the "any person" line has generally been limited to rights
that the Court has specifically designated as "fundamental." As to these
B.

equal protection clause had not yet come into its own when the "due process" debate raged in
the years between Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968). So the debate on the practical extensiveness of the fourteenth amendment was
cast in terms of due process. The subsequent expansive coverage of the equal protection clause
now makes it appropriate to recast the question in terms of "any person," meaning the
fourteenth amendment's extensiveness in nonracial matters. The spark to the 1947-1968 debate
was Justice Black's dissent in Adamson, in which he insisted that the fourteenth amendment
had been designed to reverse Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) and make the first
eight amendments applicable to the states. He relied heavily on FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908), and received some academic and historical support for his
position. But there was strong opposition, which included Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?-The Original Understanding 2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949), and Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights ?-The
Judicial Interpretation 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949). His strong supporter was Crosskey, Charles
Fairman, "Legislative History" and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954). The historical debate was never settled, but the Court, without accepting
Black's position, gradually recognized almost the entire Bill of Rights as applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment-thus expanding the protection given "any person". See
note 118 infra for the key cases in the "rights explosion."
Another fourteenth amendment historical debate of long-standing concerned the "race line",
and brought about the second hearing of the crucial set of segregation cases that have come
down to us under the name of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It is worth
recalling Chief Justice Warren's account of this occurence, in Brown:
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment
in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the
views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own
investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to
resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most
avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all
legal distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their
opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the
Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress
and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.
347 U.S. at 489.
What can be determined with remarkable certainty is what the Court has done with respect to
these two distinct lines of constitutional policy. Considering each line in relation to the other, as
well as in its own development, I turn to this task in this study. I shall also stress the remarkable
growth for each line-the "any person" line, and the "race line"--in the years since Brown.
13. Under the "suspect class" doctrine (a central element in this study), the Court refuses
to defer to legislation, or other state action, with an "invidious" racial purpose. As the basis for
such a legislative classification, race is "suspect" and, the Court will subject such a classification to "strict judicial scrutiny." See text at notes 78-81 infra.
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"fundamental rights" (which I will discuss later), and as to the "suspect
class," the Court has required "strict scrutiny" of the challenged state
action, and a showing of a "compelling state interest" to justify that
action. 14 In all other challenges, the Court views state action with greater
deference. ' 5 The history of the development of "suspect class" in the era of
Brown makes the conflict between the two lines of constitutional development apparent rather than real.' 6 Bakke, I suggest, does not relate to
"'suspect class" and the strict constitutional requirements that it entails.
C. A Decision That Preferential Minority Admissions Are Unconstitutional Would Constitute a Rejection of ConstitutionalHistory and Policy on
Race Matters Since BROWN
So directly related to race offenses is the "suspect class" doctrine, that
nothing less than a conscious- termination of the Brown era of favor for the
"race line" could lead to a decision that preferential minority admissions
are unconstitutional.
D. Such a Reversal of Direction by the Court, While Possible, Is Not
Justified by Policy Considerations That Have Been Offered
Policy concerns, pro and con, are fully explored (See Part VI. infra) and
overwhelmingly recommend reversal of the California court's decision that
preferential minority admissions, voluntarily adopted by a state's educational institutions, violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
E.

Other Concerns

Two other concerns emerge in the course of this study: (1) the role of
methodology (or formulas) in constitutional decision. The perhaps obvious
lesson to be learned is that equal protection formulas are instruments for the
expression of constitutional policy that is arrived at independently. Formulas themselves do not determine, mechanically or otherwise, a new
constitutional result;7 (2) the standing specter. There is need to face up to,
and argue against, possible application of the Supreme Court's new standing
doctrine to deny respondent, Bakke, judicial access to test his claim.' 8 This
question, somewhat removed from our main subject, is reserved for a
postscript.
14. This terminology is discussed throughout this study. The Supreme Court grouped
together the precedents, so far as the equal protection clause is concerned, in San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), discussed in text at note 128 infra.
15. This deferential formula is generally known as the "rational basis" test. But see notes
132 and 133 infra for the warnings of Justice Marshall and Professor Gunther against easy
generalization that "rational basis" has a uniform application.
16. See text at notes 131-136 infra.
17. See note 15 supra.
18. Proposed notably in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), and Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), which are discussed in the Post-
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II.

PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS IN CALIFORNIA'S COURTS

The Race Preference Problem
The problem of minority preferential admissions, like affirmative action
of any kind, has exposed deep cleavages in American society, even dividing
citizens and groups that were previously united behind the achievement of
the civil rights of minorities. 19 To the extent that preference is given to
some, whether of job seniority (under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964)20 or of scarce seats in professional schools, these benefits are unavailable to others. On what analysis can the proposition be defended that
exclusion on a basis of race is "invidious" when blacks or other minorities
are excluded, and constitutionally permissible when the exclusion is of non2' In DeFunis and Bakke this question was
minority or white applicants?
22
ways.
answered in-different
A.

script, Part VII. infra.
These cases seem to require allegations of fact that assure that plaintiff would actually
receive the relief sought, if standing to sue was granted (and his well-pleaded contentions
proved). The California trial court found that Bakke would not have been admitted in the two
years in question "even if there had been no special admissions program." 18 Cal.3d at 63, 553
P.2d at 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 700. 1 argue below (in Part VII.) that, whatever the constitutional
outcome on the equal protection issue, it is a strained conception of standing that would deny
Bakke access to the courts, to challenge this program on federal constitutional grounds.
19. Among the twenty-eight amici filing briefs in the Supreme Court in DeFunis, the
following organizations supported minority preference admissions: American Bar Association,
Association of American Law Schools, American Medical Colleges Association, Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, National Conference of Black Lawyers, President and
Fellows of Harvard College, Center for Law and Education, Harvard University, Board of
Governors of Rutgers University, Student Bar Association of Rutgers Law School, American
Indian Law Students Association, American Indian Lawyers Association, Law School Admission Council, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Council on Legal Education
Opportunity, NAACP, Legal Aid Society of Alameda City, Mexican American Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, National Organization for Women, Legal Defense and Organization
Fund, Inc., and eleven other organizations. The states of Ohio and (of course) Washington, and
the city of Seattle, also filed briefs seeking affirmance. On the other side, seeking reversal of
the state court decision favorable to minority preference, were the following: the AFL-CIO,
Committee on Academic Nondiscrimination and Integrity, Jewish Rights Council, Advocate
Society, American Jewish Committee, Joint Civic Committee of Italian Americans, Unico
National, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, American Jewish Congress, and National
Association of Manufacturers.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976), where black applicants who had been denied employment because of race were awarded
seniority status retroactive to employment application date.
21. With respect to discrimination suits under Title VII, and actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
("right ... to make and enforce contracts"), the Court spoke clearly in the 1975 term. Both
statutes were held to proscribe racial discrimination in private employment against whites and
blacks alike. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (opinion for
Court, per Marshall, J.)
Consider the racial goals in affirmative action programs ordered under Executive Order
11246, as amended (1965), administered by the Secretary of Labor, Office of Contract Compliance. Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
See also NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) and Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315
(8th Cir. 1971).
22. See text at notes 36-49 infra.
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The California Special Admissions Plan
The California plan in Bakke is well-designed for resolving the constitutional issue. In each of the relevant years, sixteen of the 100 available seats
at the University of California Medical School at Davis were set aside for
minority applicants. There were two distinct admissions committees. One
evaluated general applicants according to specified factors that excluded
race. The second, a minority admissions committee, 23 considered only
applicants who qualified by reason of race or membership in an identified
minority group and selected sixteen minority applicants by using separate
procedures and factors. 24 Allan Bakke, a non-minority applicant, was denied admission for two successive years, although it is argued his qualifications were superior to the sixteen specially admitted minority members once
race factors were not considered. Although Bakke did not show that he
would have been among those admitted even in the absence of the minority
preference plan (and this is his infirmity on the standing issue), he sought
injunctive and declaratory relief in the California courts on the ground that
the admissions plan was a violation of fourteenth amendment equal protection, as 25
an invidious discrimination against him on the impermissible basis
B.

of race.

C. In the California Courts
The trial court ruled the plan unconstitutional, but refused to order
Bakke's admission on the ground that he had not shown his right to
admission even in absence of the minority plan. On appeal, 26 the California
Supreme Court agreed that the special minority admissions plan was an
unconstitutional violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause. 27 The court labels "invidious" any discrimination by the majority
based on race, whether the discrimination is practiced against minority or
23. This "special admission committee" consists of minority students and medical school
faculty members "who are predominantly but not entirely minorities." The "regular admission
committee" is composed of a volunteer group of faculty members and an equal number of
students. Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal.3d at 41, 553 P.2d 1157, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 685.
24. For example, whereas general admission applicants with college grade point averages
below 2.5 are automatically screened out, such minority applicants are not disqualified. For
them, factors such as motivation are given special weight.
25. The university's cross-complaint sought a declaratory determination that the special
admission program was valid.
26. The appeal was heard directly by the state's highest court "prior to a decision by the
Court of Appeals because of the importance of the issues involved (CAL. CONST., art. VI,712;
rule 20, Cal. Rules of Court)." Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal.3d at 39,
553 P.2d at 1156, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
27. The court, however, reversed the trial court's denial of specific relief to Bakke,
directing it, on remand, to consider "the burden of proof shifted to the University to demonstrate that he would not have been admitted even without the special admission program." Id.
at 63, 553 P.2d at 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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majority applicants,2 8 whether it is designed to impose the stigma of inferiority or not.
The court's controlling premise is simple, and its conclusion flows in a
straight-line analysis from that premise. The origins and prime purpose of
the equal protection clause (and the rest of the Civil War amendments), 2 9
Brown, 30 and the constitutional history of the "invidious," racially-suspect
classification are constitutionally irrelevant. For, under the fourteenth
amendment, rights are personal; and, where government action is involved,
it is the supreme right of the individual to be rated on individual merit.
Frustration of enjoyment of this right by a "suspect racial classification"
invokes the strictest test of equal protection. This test stipulates strict
judicial scrutiny and the requirement that the state show a "compelling
governmental interest."
Although the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision
that the admissions program was unconstitutional, it also went a step
further. It directed the trial court to order Bakke's admission, unless the
university affirmatively proved that he would not have been admitted in the
two years in question, if there had been no minority admissions program.
The court reasoned, as follows, that the admissions program violated the
equal protection clause because:
(1) Classification by race is not per se unconstitutional. 3'
(2) Cases permitting classification by race are limited to situations
where "the purpose of the classification was to benefit rather than to
disable minority groups." 3 2 However, they have never extended to
situations having "the effect of depriving persons who were not
group of benefits which they would othermembers of a minority
'33
wise have enjoyed."
admission
(3) "It is plain that the special admission program denies
34
to some white applicants solely because of their race.",
28. The court specifically rejects Professor Ely's suggestion (Ely, The Constitutionality of
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 727-735 (1964)), "that classification by

race is not suspect if a member of the majority race discriminates against others of the same
race because the majority is not likely to underestimate the needs and qualifications of persons
of the same race and because the discrimination would not be motivated by racial prejudice."
Id. at 516, 553 P.2d at 1164, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 692.

29. "Regardless of its historical origin, the equal protection clause by its literal terms
applies to 'any person,' and its lofty purpose, to secure equality of treatment to all, is
incompatible with the premise that some races may be afforded a higher degree of protection
against unequal treatment than others." Id. at 51, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691.

30. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Of the three references to Brown in the
opinion, two simply reject its relevance. Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 18
Cal. 3d at 50, 58, 553 P.2d at 1163, 1169, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691, 697. The third recalls that "since
Brown", the Court has often said "there is no right to a segregated education." Id. at 47, 553
P.2d at 1161, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
31. Id. at 46, 553 P.2d at 1160, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 688. See note 43 infra.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 47, 553 P.2d at 1161, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
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(4) "Classification by race is subject to strict scrutiny, at least
where the classification results in detriment to a person because of
his race." The government must also prove that "the purpose of the
classification serve[s] a 'compelling state interest'. . .[and] that
there are no reasonable ways to achieve the state's goals by means
which impose a lesser limitation
on the rights of the group disadvan3 5
taged by the classification."
D. The DeFunis Experience
The Washington Supreme Court in DeFunis v. Odegaard had also held
that the preferential minority admissions test required "strict judicial
scrutiny." However, it concluded that the state had demonstrated a "compelling state interest," and sustained the test, against equal protection
objection, by using the following analysis:
(1) The state goals were to obtain "reasonable representation from
minorities within its [law school] classes," and "to increase participation within the legal profession by persons from racial and ethnic
groups which have been historically denied access to the profession
and which, consequently, are grossly underrepresented within the
legal system ....",36
(2) "The goal of this policy was not to separate the races, but to
bring them together-and [it doesi not represent a covert attempt to
stigmatize the majority race as inferior; nor is it reasonable to expect
.,37
that [this will be] a possible effect ....
38
39
(3) Brown, read with Swann and Green,40 established that
school authorities, at least, "may consider race as a valid criterion
when considering admissions and producing a student body.... ."'
(4) Plaintiff DeFunis attempted to distinguish these segregation
cases on the ground that none of them denied any non-minority
students an education. The court said this distinction was irrelevant
because "the denial of a 'benefit' on the basis of race is not necessarily a per se violation of the fourteenth amendment, if the racial
classification is used in a compensatory way to promote integration. ''42
(5) Having held that use of race as a factor in the admissions policy
of a state law school is not per se a violation of the equal protection
clause, the Washington court asked what the appropriate standard of
review should be when attempting "to determine the constitutionality of such a classification." It surprisingly opted for the strict test:
35.

Id. at 49, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690.

36. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. at 20, 507 P.2d at 1175.
37.

Id. at 27, 507 P.2d at 1179.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Green v. New Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. at 29, 507 P.2d at 1180.
Id. at 30, 507 P.2d at 1181.
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"The burden is upon the law school to show that its consideration of
race in admitting students is necessary to the accomplishment of a
compelling state interest." The state had contended that since "con-

sideration of race here" was benign, the "less strict 'rational basis'
test" was appropriate. The court said, however, that the "less
strict" test was not appropriate because "the minority admissions
with respect to non-minority students
policy is certainly not benign
43
who are displaced by it."
(6) The court then concluded that the minority admissions policy
satisfied the "compelling state interest" test on three separate
grounds. 4 Accordingly, the Washington Supreme Court dismissed
DeFunis' complaint.

Thus, the Washington court in DeFunis found permissible only those
racial classifications which were used "in a compensatory way to promote
integration." 45 This "compensatory" view depended upon Brown, Green,
Swann and the employment cases. 46 The Washington court's restriction was
without case support. In fact, the desegregation cases merely illustrate the
more general principle that racial classifications are "suspect" only when
they purposefully exclude. The Washington court erred again when it held,
without analysis, that "benign" racial classifications trigger the strict test.
As we shall see, whether or not benign racial classifications do require strict
scrutiny is the main question in contest.
The United States Supreme Court, after granting DeFunis' petition for
certiorari, mooted the case (by a 5-4 vote) on grounds of his forthcoming
43. Id. at 32, 507 P.2d at 1182. To this point, there is no difference between the California
and Washington courts. Clearly no affirmative action is "benign" to those not included.-The
Washington court assumed, without analysis, that their deprivation furnished the trigger to the
strict test of equal protection. This was odd, in view of its overstrenuous efforts (using Brown,
Swann and Green) to refute the hypothesis that a racial classification was unconstitutional per
se. To its credit, the California court, in Bakke, never pressed the argument that a racial
classification was a per se violation: "Classification by race has been upheld in a number of
cases in which the purpose of the classification was to benefit rather than to disable minority
groups." Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal. 3d at 46, 553 P.2d at 1160,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
44. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. at 35-36, 507 P.2d at 1184:
The state interest in eliminating racial imbalance within public legal education as a whole,
"the educational interest of the state in producing a racially balanced student body at the
law school," and the state's interest in overcoming "the shortage of minority attorneysand, consequently minority prosecutors, judges and public officials." Further, the program met "the test of necessity here because racial imbalance in the law school and the
legal profession is the evil to be corrected, and it can only be corrected by providing legal
education to those minority groups which have been previously deprived. . . . If the law
school is forbidden from taking affirmative action, this underrepresentation may be
perpetuated indefinitely. No less restrictive means would serve the governmental interest
here. . ..
45. Id. at 30, 507 P.2d at 1181.
46. The California court rejected the applicability of these cases, arguing that such cases
presupposed a finding of past discrimination, which was absent from the record in both
DeFunis and Bakke. Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal.3d at 57, 553 P.2d
at 1168, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
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graduation.4 7 Justice Douglas wrote a lengthy dissent. It bears notice, both
because it is the only intimation from the Court on the merits, and because it
was faithfully echoed by the California Supreme Court in Bakke. Justice
Douglas reached the merits, and, while avowing sympathy for the announced state objectives, would have vacated the judgment of the Washington
Supreme Court and remanded the case for a new trial-with firm admoni-

tions. 48
Having dwelt upon the similarities and divergences in the two state
supreme courts' handling of preferential admissions, I will hereafter focus
upon the California decision in Bakke.
E.

Why the California Court Should Be Reversed
The California court's opinion may be summarized in four steps. I list
them below, followed by the arguable positions I develop later as to how it
went wrong, if United States Supreme Court decisions are to be taken as the
guide.
1. California Court: The preferential admissions standards, by using race
as a factor, constitute a "suspect classification."
The answer: This is wrong on two grounds-(1) there is no showing of
an "invidious" purpose; (2) the "suspect class" doctrine is concerned
with protecting "discrete, insular minorities," and not members of the
racial majority who are discontent with governmental policy.
2. California Court: The equal protection clause protects not merely
minorities, but "any person" who can establish infringement of a constitutional right.
The answer: Clearly this is true. But the right in question, unless it has
been designated as "fundamental," must be tested against the state's
presumptive right to implement its public policy. Although Bakke has no
right to be admitted to state medical school-unless he complies with
established admission requirements, including space availabilities-he
has the right not to be excluded "arbitrarily," or on "invidious"
grounds; and, he may ask the state to prove that the excluding requirement has a reasonable basis in light of a permissible state purpose.
There is no argument that Bakke was treated arbitrarily; there is no
47. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). After DeFunis filed his petition for certiorari, Justice Douglas stayed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court, pending "final
disposition of the case by this Court." DeFunis was in the last quarter of his third year in law
school at the time of oral argument. Id. at 315.

48. The key to the problem is consideration of such applications in a racially neutral way
..
A finding that the state school employed a racial classification in selecting its
students subjects it to the strictest scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. . . . A
DeFunis who is white is entitled to no advantage by reason of that fact; nor is he subject to
any disability, no matter his race or color. Whatever his race, he had a constitutional right
to have his application considered on its individual merits in a racially neutral manner. . . . If discrimination based on race is constitutionally permissible when those who
hold the .reins can come up with 'compelling' reasons to justify it, then constitutional
guarantees acquire an accordionlike quality. . ..
Id. at 333, 334, 337, 343.
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showing of "invidious" purpose (See (1), above). It remains only for the
state to furnish a "rational basis" for its program. This is hardly in
doubt, and will be dealt with below.
3. California Court: The correct formula, triggered by a "suspect classification" of race, is the strict test of "compelling state interest," and
includes the requirement that the state show that its objective cannot be
achieved by nonracial means.
The answer: Because there is no "suspect class" (See (1), above), the
strict "compelling state interest" test is not applicable, and the standard
of review is as stated in (2), above.
4. California Court: The preferential admission standards must be held
unconstitutional, because however laudable they may appear to some,
the state's reasons for employing them are not "compelling," and the
state's goals may be achieved in other non-racial ways.
The answer: While it is clear from answers (1)-(3) above that the strict
"compelling state interest" test is not applicable, the state must furnish
at least a "rational basis" (See (2), above) for its program. Assuming
that is done, and if the Court follows its previous decisions in the Brown
era, it should reverse the California court. However, two reasons remain which justify an extended discussion of policy grounds in light of
the interests in contest: (1) the possibility that the Court would consider
reversing the whole direction of decisionmaking in racial cases in the era
of Brown; (2) the warning of Justices Marshall and White that the
justices in fact carefully examine the varieties of interests and impacts,
even when the Court is ostensibly using a deferential formula of review
such as "rational basis." Accordingly, the competing policy arguments
will be fully addressed.
At the outset, I suggested that we could usefully consider the preferential
admissions problem in terms of two distinct lines of constitutional policy
relating to the fourteenth amendment-the "race" line, and the "any
person," nonracial line. In the next section, I concentrate upon the "race"
line in the Brown era, with special attention to the "suspect classification"
doctrine. In a later section I shall deal particularly with the "any person"
line.
III.

THE

SPIRIT OF BROWN: "SUSPECT

CLASSES"

AND

THE "RACE LINE"
United States Supreme Court decisions following closely upon their
enactment, stressed that the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
were principally concerned with eliminating the vestiges of slavery and
bringing the new black citizens into full participation in American life. At
the same time, these decisions recognized that the amendments extended
protection to "any person." 49 But a reactive period in the race line commenced with the Civil Rights Cases5" in 1883, reached a new low point in
49. See note 9 supra.
50. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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Plessy v. Ferguson5 in 1896, and continued to Brown v. Board of Education5 2 in 1954. In this period, the emphasis changed. Forgotten was the
principle that the central target of the Civil War Amendments was race. The
Civil Rights Cases limited the reach of the fourteenth amendment to situations in which discriminatory state action was involved, and made the
thirteenth amendment a dead letter beyond slavery itself. Plessy likewise
damaged "equal protection," as far as race was concerned. The fifteenth
amendment's command against abridging voting rights because of race was
sidestepped by practical state control of registration and other voting requirements, and by social pressures, which effectively limited participation
by blacks in the elective process. In the 1940's, some decisional stirrings
hinted that the reactive period might be nearing its end. 53 But not until 1954,
with the Court's unanimous decision in Brown, was it clear a new era had
begun.
This Brown era brought a new commitment to the forgotten pledges to
blacks of full membership, and full personhood. 54 At the same time, the
51. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. Notable examples were Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and the cases cited in
note 62 infra.
54. Since Brown (1954), the Court has identified again the original design of the Civil War
Amendments and attuned itself, and the nation, to the consequences of the 1883-1954 reactive
period. A few examples will suffice:
a. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). The Court struck down an anti-cohabitation
statute making race the crucial factor in a criminal offense. Justice Harlan (concurring) stressed
that the "proper test" to justify such a racial classification is "necessity, not mere reasonable
relationship", and continued:
[This] test which developed to protect free speech against state infringement should be
equally applicable in a case involving state racial discrimination-prohibition of which lies
at the very heart of the Fourteenth Amendment. (emphasis added).
b. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Striking down the Virginia statute barring interracial marriage, the Court said:
The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official
sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States.
c. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). A city charter required that ordinances regulating property interests "on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry" must
first be approved by the electorate. Declaring that the charter provision violated equal protection, the Court explained:
Here . . . there was an explicitly racial classification treating racial housing matters
differently from other racial and housing matters. . . .Because the core of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the prevention of meaningful and unjustified official distinctionsbased on
race, . . . racial classifications are "constitutionally suspect".
d. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). In this case the Court upheld, against an equal
protection challenge, the municipality's decision to close its public swimming pools, but Justice
Black's majority opinion squarely stated: "The Equal Protection Clause was principallydesigned to protect Negroes against discriminatory action by the States." (emphasis added)
e. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968). In this epoch-making decision, the Court explicitly
overruled the restrictive interpretation given the thirteenth amendment in the Civil Rights
Cases. It held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and the thirteenth amendment were enacted to eliminate
restraints on "those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom," and went on:
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free exercise of those
rights, were substitutes for the slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes from white
communities became a substitute for the Black Codes. And when racial discrimination
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Court was engaged in broadly expanding the general ("any person")
coverage of the "equal protection" and "due process" clauses of the
fourteenth amendment.5 5 On occasion the Court specifically recalled the
special position of race, vis-a-vis the fourteenth, as well as the other Civil
War Amendments.5 6 In the course of the development of the Brown era, the
Court also developed a methodology, almost ad hoc, that blurred the
distinction between the race and the "any person" lines of development.
The methodology is not the message, but its development reinforces the
view that with Brown, the Court set its course towards implementing the
original position of the Civil War Amendments with respect to race.
A.

The "Race" Line: Up to

BROWN

Some tension has existed between the "race" line and the "any person"
line from the beginning of the judicial interpretation of the Civil War
Amendments. The comparatively favorable emphasis given the "race" line
in the Slaughter-House Cases57 (a suit to establish national constitutional
control over a local monopoly) was at the expense of the "any person" line.
In the Civil Rights Cases58 ten years later, the confinement of the fourteenth
herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their
skin, then it too is a relic of slavery ...
There is no suggestion that state (or private) action is presently excluding blacks from
professional schools because of their race. But the relevance of Jones, and the other reavowals
of the pro-black design of the Civil War Amendments to preferential admissions may be readily
seen. In the Brown era, there has been recognition of the consonance of preferential admissions
to professional schools and the advance of black citizens to full citizenship. Admission to law
schools is not indispensable to full participation in the political and governmental process.
Obviously, legislators and administrators need not be lawyers; but, judges do. No statistical
compilation is required to convince one that a high percentage of legislators, and of top-ranking
governmental administrators, are lawyers. A group that does not participate in significant
numbers in law school education will hardly be fairly equipped for its share in government, and
for its role in helping safeguard "those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil
freedom." (Jones v. Mayer, supra). No extended argument is required to verify, in this of all
ages, that a race or national group that lacks opportunity for significant participation in the
medical profession is excluded from the mainstream of social leadership and human development.
The question is, concededly, not only what the equal protection clause was seen to be at the
outset, but what it has become in the crucible of judicial interpretation and attitudes, across
history. I suggested above (note 9 supra) that three such attitudes can be identified: (1) (18731883). The first wave of decisions, (quoted in note 9 supra) noted stressed full black participation in the society, by virtue of his new citizenship. (2) (1883-1954). In this period, the spirit of
the Civil Rights Cases (1883) and of Plessy prevailed. By the turn of the century, in matters of
race, equal protection has been all but emasculated. The spirit of the Civil Rights Cases and
Plessy made it easier to sustain the racial classification in Korematsu (see note 76 infra). (3)
(1954- - ) The spirit of Brown makes less likely another Korematsu. Likewise, I shall argue
that it makes judicial intervention unacceptable, on equal protection grounds, to overturn
preferential racial admissions.
55. As to due process, see note 12 supra and text at notes 114-126 infra; as to equal
protection, see text at notes 104-113 infra.
56. See notes 6-8 supra.
57. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The ruling was only comparatively favorable, because the
whole tenor of the decision was restricting all extensiveness of the fourteenth amendment.
58. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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amendment to correct state action that had already offended, and the restriction of congressional power under the enforcement clause (section five),
were certainly blows to the "race" line. But this decision was also designed
to confine national power under the fourteenth amendment for all purposes,
and so to limit the "any person" line as well. 59 The Civil Rights Cases'
tortuous construction of the thirteenth amendment, rejecting its applicability
to racial discrimination as a "badge of slavery," dealt its most telling blow
to the hopes that the Civil War Amendments had held out to the new citizens
as racial remedies. With Plessy v. Ferguson,6 in 1896, the other shoe fell
when the Court specifically denied that the equal protection clause constituted a bar to segregated public facilities. Over Justice Harlan's eloquent
protest, the Court resonated the Civil Rights Cases' philosophy that racial
discrimination was largely a private, perhaps imagined fault, and not actionable as a "badge of slavery," and that enforced separation of the races,
publicly sanctioned, was not a denial of equal protection. Plessy effectively
arrested development of the race line for four decades, at a time when (as we
shall see) the nonracial, "any person" line was beginning to extend national
protection to "any person" in areas of property and contract.
B.

The Spirit of BROWN
From the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, race was a permissible classification
for denying citizens' use of public facilities. Alleged availability of comparable "separate" facilities saved the racial classification from being "unequal." The explicit racial formula accepted in Plessy was justified until
Brown;6 1 and "separate" public facilities were allowed to whites unless the
Court expressly found that the facilities set aside for blacks were, in fact, not
equal. 62 In Plessy the first Justice Harlan had warned in dissent that the
constitutional question was not whether "material" equality was achieved,
but whether the fourteenth amendment wiped out separation in public
facilities, since such enforced segregation reinforced a perceived stigma of
inferiority.63
59. This is in no way to blunt the racist design of these cases, in the spirit of the so-called
"compromise of 1877" - with respect to what was euphemistically called the "Southern
question." See Scott, Justice Bradley's Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth Amendment from
the Slaughterhouse Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 552 (1971).
60. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
61. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. For example, McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950), Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), and Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337 (1938).
63. "We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples. But it is
difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of
servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before the law.
The thin disguise of 'equal' accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead
anyone, nor atone for the wrong this day done." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 562.
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Finally, in 1954, Brown stated that in public education, enforced racial
separation was "inherently" unequal; that is, totally and per se. 64 The
decision was unanimous, but the underlying analysis was peculiar and
unsatisfying. The opinion seemed to argue that, in education, the perception
of the stigma of separation by black students made equal education psychologically impossible. 65 The point was made later that the psychological data
relied on in Brown was not compelling, or even convincing. 66 But by this
time the Court had gone well beyond the precise facts of Brown and ruled
out any enforced segregation in use of public facilities on equal protection
68
grounds. 67 The inference is inescapable that, without saying so as a Court,
the United States Supreme Court had in fact and in law accepted the first
Justice Harlan's analysis in Plessy. Chief Justice Burger's 1971 opinion for
a still unanimous Court, in Swann,69 contains a fair suggestion of the
Court's continuing institutional understanding of Brown's design:
Provision for optional transfer of those in the majority racial
group of a particular school to other schools where they will be in the

minority is an indispensable remedy for those students willing to
64. "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason
of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 495.
65. The Court adopted, as its own, the finding of the trial court in the Kansas case (Brown)
which had decided against the plaintiffs: "[tihe policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of'the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law . . . has a tendency to
[retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some
of the benefits they would receive in a racial(ly) integrated school system." Id. at 494. In the
celebrated "footnote 11", the Court then cited psychological studies as "modern authority",
amply supporting this finding.
66. See, e.g., Van den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases. A Reply
to Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL L. REV. 69 (1960); Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 150
(1955).
67. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); and
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955). These were in the first wave of per curiam
orders. They reached well beyond education; to beaches, golf courses and buses. By 1963, the
Court said outright: "it is no longer open to question that a State may not constitutionally
require segregation of public facilities." Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
68. But see Justice Black's comment in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966): "In Brown v. Board of Education, the Court today purports to find precedent for using
the Equal Protection Clause to keep the Constitution up to date. I did not vote to hold
segregation in public schools unconstitutional on any such theory. I thought when Brown was
written, and I think now, that Mr. Justice Harlan was correct in 1896 when he dissented from
Plessy v. Ferguson ....
" Id. at 677.
69. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The Court had
maintained a united front in major school segregation cases from Brown to Swann; thereafter it
broke ranks. The Chief Justice's opinion, in Swann, contained sweeping dicta: "School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational
policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a
pluralistic society, each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole." 402 U.S. at 16.
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transfer to other schools in order to lessen the impact on them of the
state-imposed stigma of segregation. (emphasis added) 70

Whatever else it may mean, the equal protection clause in Brown,
Green,"I Swann and the other segregation cases stands for the proposition
that governmental racial classifications that connote a stigma of inferiority
are per se bad and must be eliminated "root and branch." ' 72 The only
continuing debate on this point concerns the mode and pace of their termination. However, the segregation cases are the beginning and not the end of
the inquiry into the case law applicable to the racial preference admissions
problem. The Brown period, beyond the segregation cases, has seen an
expanded hospitality to claims of racial discrimination through the thirteenth
and fifteenth amendments and the equal protection, due process and enforcement clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Our next specific concern
is to examine the development of equal protection against racial discrimination in the "suspect class" doctrine. While such protection has been available to other races, nationalities and ethnic groups, cases pressed by black
citizens in the Brown era have brought the "suspect classification" doctrine
to maturity.
C.

"Suspect Classifications" and the "Race Line"
Offensive discrimination under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause was never conceived to be restricted to the black race.7 3 As early
70. Id. at 26.
71. Green v. New Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In this crucial case, the
Court expressed impatience at the slowness of the conversion from dual racial schools to a
unified integrated system, directed the elimination of dual systems "root and branch", and
warned that "delays are no longer tolerable".
72. "School boards such as the respondent then operating state-compelled dual systems
were nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch. The constitutional rights of Negro school children articulated in Brown I permit no
less than this ....
" Id. at 437-38. Racially inspired school board actions in Denver were the
basis for a sweeping order in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189
(1973). But the opinion of Justice Brennan, for the Court, stressed that the remedy was rooted
in findings of de jure segregation by governmental action: "We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or
intent to segregate." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. at 208.
73. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). In this case a state law barring
blacks from a jury was denounced by the Court as violating the fourteenth amendment. The
equal protection clause was explained as "declaring that the law in the States shall be the same
for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal
before the laws of the States, and in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the
amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them because
of their color." Then the Court affirmed the statement in the text: "Nor would it be [anything
but discrimination] if the persons excluded by it [the statute] were white men . . . nor if a law
should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen, would there be any doubt of its
inconsistency with the spirit of the amendment." Id. at 308. Anticipating Justice Harlan in
Plessy, the opinion then stressed again the special relationship of the amendment to blacks:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right
to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though
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as 1887, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 74 the equal protection clause was invoked
to brand administrative action unconstitutional, where it resulted in racial
discrimination against Chinese subjects under a racially neutral statute. For
"no reason . . . except hostility to the race and nationality to which
were denied participation in "their
petitioners belong," the petitioners
75
harmless and useful occupation."
The 1944 Japanese-American detention case, Korematsu v. United
States,76 was an appeal from a criminal conviction for violation of the
military order in World War II confining all persons of Japanese ancestry,
citizens and noncitizens alike, in prescribed military areas in California.
Justice Black, speaking for a 6-3 Court affirming the conviction against a
claim of invidious racial discrimination, endeavored to label this ruling a
war power, and not a racial decision." Justices Roberts, Murphy and
dissented vigorously. The case has been subjected to strong critiJackson
78
cism.
In Oyama v. California79 in 1948, the Court struck down application of
the California Alien Land Law to Oyama, an American citizen, insofar as it
discriminated against him on the basis of his parents' country of origin. The
which would
Court found that "there is absent the compelling justification
80
be needed to sustain discrimination of that nature."
No explicitly racial classification has been upheld by the Court since
Korematsu, writes one author. 8' The focus is more precise if we rephrase
this to say that no invidious racial classification has been upheld since
Brown. With the Brown era cases of the 1960's-McLaughlin,Loving and
they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon
them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others. Id. at 308.
74. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
75. Id. at 374.
76. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In the previous year the Court had already upheld curfew orders
under the same military order, in a unanimous decision. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81 (1943). However, in a decision handed down with Korematsu, the Court found a lack of
authority for continued detention under the order. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
77. "To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military
dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from
the Military area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war
with the Japanese Empire .... ." Id. at 223.
In the course, one might say, of protesting too much, Justice Black gratuitously and uncritically gave birth to what was to become a constitutional formula: -[A]II legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions;
racial antagonisms never can." Id. at 216. See note 192 infra.
78. Rostow, The JapaneseAmerican Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
79. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
80. Id. at 640.
81. P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 485 (1975). Accord, Douglas J. in DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 337.
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Hunter"2-it became apparent that the "suspect class" category was deeply
imbued with the "race line" interpretation of the fourteenth amendment,
and that a conscious methodology to implement this policy was hardening.
In McLaughlin v. Florida8 3 the Court invalidated, on equal protection
grounds, a statute that made racial cohabitation a special and separate
offense. The Court rejected the argument that the requirement of equal
protection of the laws is satisfied so long as white and black participants in
the offense were similarly punished.8 4 In the same year, the Court declared
unconstitutional a state statute that required the race of every candidate for
elective office to be placed on the ballot because ". . .placing of the power
of the State behind a racial classification induces racial prejudice at the
85
polls.'"
Three years later the Court struck down a Virginia statute framed "to
prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications. "86 Relying on McLaughlin, the Court said: "There can be no doubt
that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications
violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." 87 The ground
for overturning the statutes there, as in the desegregation cases, was plainly
that the statutes were designed to perpetuate the stigma of inferiority. These
two cases left the incidental legacy that racial classifications were not per se
bad, but that
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial
classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected
to the 'most rigid scrutiny' and, if they are ever to be upheld, they
must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some
permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination
which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate. 88
The Court concluded, in Loving, that "there is patently no legitimate
overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which
justifies this classification" (against mixed racial marriages) and described
the classification as simply a measure "designed to maintain White Supremacy.89
Like Brown, then, these anti-racial classification cases were tied to
"(t)he clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the
States.

'90

82. See note 54 supra.
83. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
84. Id. at 189-91. The relevant question was whether "there is an arbitrary or invidious
discrimination between those classes covered . . . and those excluded." Id. at 191.
85. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
86. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
87. Id. at 12.
88. Id. at 11.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 10. Justice Douglas, writing in 1959, left the door ajar to racial classification for
other ("noninvidious"?) purposes:
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We have just discussed "suspect classification"--a prime example of,
and agency for, the Court's favoring of the "racial line". In the Brown era,
there have been many other illustrations of this favoring. I merely note them
here, and will return to some of them later. The school segregation cases, of
course, are the most widely known. But the Court has also repudiated the
Civil Rights Cases' 91 refusal to extend the thirteenth amendment to discrimination as a "badge of slavery." Jones v. Mayer.92 It has ended the
long-standing slumber of the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment (section five), and done so in a racial context. cf. Katzenbach v.
Morgan93 and Oregon v. Mitchell.94 And the Court has found special equal
protection clause powers to reach racially-motivated redistricting arrangements. White v. Regester.95 In addition, the Brown era has seen unprecedented congressional favor, sanctioned by the Court-legislation against
racial discrimination in use of public facilities, in commerce, in housing, in
employment and legislation making possible effective minority exercise of
the franchise.
During this same period, there has been a somewhat comparable expansion of the "any person," nonracial line of fourteenth amendment protection, which I shall now consider.

IV.

THE OTHER LINE-THE "ANY PERSON"
OR NONRACIAL LINE
I turn now to the other main line of fourteenth amendment interpretation,
which I have called the "any person" or nonracial line. Two other concerns
of the Court have overlapped this expanded protection against racial discrimination in the Brown era: (1) an unprecedented expanded development
of the protection of "any person," both an enlarged recognition of due
process "fundamental" rights, and an expanded coverage by the equal
protection clause; and (2) an increased recognition of inchoate rights, or
interests, formerly dismissed as mere privileges. Even in absence of a right
ordinarily to participate in a public benefit save on terms arranged by the
state, there has been insistence that the state's terms not be fixed so as to
harm a potential participant in an "invidious" or "arbitrary" way.
Experience shows that liquor has a devastating effect on the North American Indian and
Eskimo. It is, therefore, commonly provided in the United States and Canada that no
liquor should be sold to those races. Other regulations based on race may likewise be
justified by reason of the special traits of those races, such, for example, as their
susceptibility to particular diseases. What at first blush may seem to be an invidious
discrimination
DOUGLAS, WE
91. 109 U.S.
92. 392 U.S.
93. 384 U.S.
94. 400 U.S.
95. 412 U.S.

may on analysis be found to have plausible grounds justifying it. W.
THE JUDGES, 399 (1956).
3 (1883).
409 (1968).
641 (1966).
112 (1970).
755 (1973).
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First, I shall recall the historical antecedents of the "any person" line of
fourteenth amendment interpretation. Then I shall consider, in order, the
expanded equal protection coverage in non-racial matters, the "fundamental
rights" due process explosion, and the demise of the mere "privilege"
doctrine where state violation of the Constitution is asserted. In addition, I
shall note the development of a methodology of "strict scrutiny" that
parallels the "strict scrutiny"-"compelling state interest" test we just noted
in the "race line" section.
A.

HistoricalAntecedents

Consideration of the development of the "any person" line can be
pursued most advantageously in the context of the "due process" clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The "privileges and immunities" clause has
been practically a dead letter since Slaughter-House96 and, as we shall see,
the "equal protection" clause aroused slight interest outside of racial cases
until the 1960's. A restrictive interpretation of the "due process" clause,
even in nonracial matters, persisted after Slaughter-House and the Civil
Rights Cases.97 Over Justice Field's vigorous dissents,98 the Court hesitated
to interfere with any state action. But, beginning in 1890, with Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota99 the Field dissents became
majority doctrine, cf. Allgeyer v. Louisiana.100 A new chapter of fourteenth
amendment relief for "any person" was written-substantive due process
aimed at state economic legislation. The next significant development was
the Court's recognition that certain rights, denominated as "fundamental,"
were protected against state action by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. At first, these were rights specified in the first amendment. 10 1 In the years just prior to Brown, the Court considered other rights
specified in the first eight amendments. 10 2 During the 1960s, this due
process development would continue at an accelerated pace. And, surprisingly, equal protection for "any person" would assume importance for the
first time.
96. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See note 9 supra.
97. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
98. Cf. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885), Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co.,
I11 U.S. 746.(1883) and Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
99. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
100. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adamson v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
101. The "fundamental right" framework was inspired by Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908). A more remote antecedent is Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) ("fundamental principles of liberty and justice." Id. at 535).
The pioneer first amendment cases are listed in note 115 infra.
102. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). As early as 1932, the right to counsel in
a capital case had been held to be a "fundamental right", enforcible against a state through the
fourteenth amendment. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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Equal Protection in Non-Racial Contexts
Before the 1960s, the corpus of equal protection decisions in the United
States Supreme Court was slender. Challenges to state action on equal
protection grounds were rare and, outside of the race cases, were usually
disposed of after very deferential review. A statute was upheld if there were
some "rational basis" for the state's classification, and this was ordinarily
detected. 103 In the landmark legislative apportionment decision, Baker v.
Carr,10 4 in 1962, the Court upheld on equal protection grounds a state
voter's "any person" claim that state malapportionment of legislative
districts had diluted his personal vote. After Baker, equal protection litigation has assumed an increasingly larger part of the Court's time.
In the pre-1960s period, when deferential review of equal protection
challenges was the rule, an exception, of course, occurred in the race
cases. 105 A second exception was the somewhat lonely precedent of Skinner
v. Oklahoma" (discussed below), where "basic civil rights" were infringed by a state classification. Here too, the Court called for "strict scrutiny."
When the burgeoning "fundamental rights" were involved in a constitutional challenge, either of equal protection or of due process, the Court came,
almost ad hoc, to require a strict test be applied to the statute. This
happened in both the equal protection race cases and in Skinner, which
heads everyone's list of cases that laid the groundwork for non-deferential
equal protection review outside the race area. Skinner involved a state law
authorizing sterilization of persons convicted of certain felonies. Noting that
the penalty, loss of procreative powers, "involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. . .a basic liberty," the Court held that "strict scrutiny" was
required of the classification of inclusion and exclusion. Justice Douglas'
majority opinion insisted that such cases required "strict scrutiny"--0 7
"lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made."'
Skinner is a forerunner to the personal rights and substantive due process
cases, such as Loving, 10 8 Griswold1° and Roe v. Wade, 110 which we meet
later.
103. The paradigm cases are Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) and
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
104. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
105. See test at notes 64-90 supra.
106. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
107. Id. at 541. The Skinner opinion was a brilliant tour de force that overturned a sterilization statute on equal protection grounds, in face of a decision by the Court that had upheld a
comparable state sterilization statute against a due process challenge. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200 (1927). This was Justice Holmes' opinion, arguing in support of the statute, that "three
generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207.
108. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court added a second basis to the equal
protection ground for overturning the anti-interracial marriage statute: "These statutes also
deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law . . . . Marriage is one of the 'basic
civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival" (citing Skinner. v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)). Id. at 12.
109. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
110. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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That the more stringent review standard is ordinarily less available in
'any person" (nonracial equal protection) cases than in the "race line" of
cases may be illustrated in the contrast between two look-alike cases that
had different outcomes. In Hunter v. Erickson,"' in 1969, the Court held
that Akron's amendment of its city charter to prevent the city council from
implementing any ordinance dealing with racial, religious or ancestral
discrimination in housing, until it had been specifically approved by the
electorate, violated equal protection. The amendment denied a black citizen
equal protection of the laws, because it treated "racial housing matters
differently than other racial and housing matters." Two terms later, in
James v. Valtierra,112 the Court considered a California constitutional
requirement to submit low-rent public housing decisions to a special community election. Low-cost housing clients claimed that they had thereby
been denied equal protection. The district court granted plaintiffs relief,
relying on Hunter. The Supreme Court reversed, and explained:
The present case could be affirmed only by extending Hunter, and
this we decline to do. . . .Hunter rested on the conclusion that
Akron's referendum law denied equal protection by placing "special
burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process." Unlike the Akron referendum position, it cannot be said that California's Article XXXIV rests on "distinctions based on race .... ,,13
After Hunter-James, it was clearer that the "strict scrutiny" in "any
person" cases was restricted to situations where state action impinged upon
a "fundamental right."
C.

Due Process and "FundamentalRights"
At the same time that the Brown sequelae 114 were unfolding, the Court
commenced to use a new formulation with respect to first amendment rights,
which had been identified as "fundamental" in a familiar earlier series of
cases. 115 Rejecting Justices Black and Douglas' position that the first
I 11.
393 U.S. 385 (1969).
112. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
113. Id. at 140-41.
114. See the per curiams cited in note 67 supra. The significance of these cases is that they
made clear that the letter as well as the spirit of Brown extended beyond the education area,
with its psychological limitations, to all public facilities. The McLaughlin-Loving development
in equal protection was also in the spirit of Brown. Recall that those cases rejected an earlier
case that had decided the interracial issue the other way. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
As late as 1955 and 1956, the Supreme Court twice resorted to obscure procedural grounds to
avoid considering a Virginia decision that upheld the statute later overturned in Loving. Naim
v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), 350 U.S. 985 (1956). The Court's use of technicalities in the Naim
appeals are discussed in G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1601-03
(9th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GUNTHER].
115. This development commenced with a dictum in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925), and continued by identifying first amendment rights as "fundamental" and "protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" (Id. at 666) in the following cases:
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.449 (1958) (association); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. I
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amendment rights were absolute, the Court first experimented with the
notion that the first amendment rights had a "preferred position" that
required special judicial deference.' 16 In the late 1950s, the Court held that
for such rights to be overridden, the "subordinating governmental interest
must be compelling," 1 7 or, in the118more enduring formulation, there must
be a "compelling state interest."
By the mid-1960s, in Griswold v. Connecticut," 9 the Court revived the
notion of substantive due process (which had been discarded for over 20
years in economic matters) in the area of personal rights, identifying an
undefined, but "fundamental" right of privacy. Building there on Skinner, 120 a non-racial equal protection case, and on McLaughlin1 21 and
Loving,122 cases with predominantly racial dimensions, the Court in Griswold 123 again invoked "compelling state interest" as the constitutional test.
The wave of apportionment cases launched in Baker v. Carr'24 sounded
in equal protection, but they signalled a new attention by the Court to a
(1947) (religion-establishment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 2% (1940) (religion); Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (assembly); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (speech); De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.353 (1937) (assembly); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.233
(1936) (press); Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (religion); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 647 (1931) (press); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (speech).
116. The classic source of this short-lived view was the celebrated "footnote 4" of Justice
Stone's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See also
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88, 90 (1949); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600 (1942);
Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
"Footnote 4" has had great influence. It raised the possibility of less judicial deference
"when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth," and when a statute "restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation." More squarely in the
focus of this article, Justice Stone queried whether "more exacting judicial scrutiny" was
needed of statutes "directed at particular religions . . . or racial minorities." Pursuing the
racial inquiry, in a much-cited passage, he asked, "whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied on to protect minorities. . . . "304 U.S. at 153.
117. The genesis may be traced from a concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, (1957), to majority acceptance in NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958), and Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
118. This definitive formulation first appeared in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
The aspect of "less drastic means," which became an essential part of the compelling governmental interest test, derives in this context from Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). Cf.
"reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests,"
used in a commerce clause context. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354
(1951). See Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principleand Economic Due Process, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967). Consider also the expansion of "procedural due process" (applying
most of the first eight amendments to the states), notably in the cases from Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (4th amendment-exclusionary rule, extending Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949)), to Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy).
119. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
120. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
121. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
122. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
123. From Griswold followed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the paradigm of the Court's
mechanical use of the formula.
124. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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"fundamental right" to participate in the voting process. 125 These cases
were also brought under the "compelling state interest" test, which by now
governed the expanded list of "fundamental rights" in both equal protection
and due process cases, as well as those other equal protection cases involving a "suspect" class, race or nationality. All these categories were subject
to "strict judicial scrutiny," and could be justified only by showing of the
"compelling governmental interest."
For a time, all analysis ended when this strict standard was invoked.
Subsequently, the Court began to inquire whether there actually was, in the
circumstances presented, a "compelling state interest". But the answer was
so invariably "no" that Chief Justice Burger commented, in an aggravated
dissent: "So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly
insurmountable standard and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing
1 26
less than perfection."
D.

Decline of the "Privilege" Doctrine

A further significant development in the "any person," nonracial line of
fourteenth amendment decision-making by the Supreme Court, was the
decline and fall of the privilege doctrine, and the recognition by the Court of
a measure of constitutional protection for "entitlements," or inchoate rights
to access to governmental benefits, that had earlier been regarded as mere
"privileges." This protection encompasses claims such as are now asserted
by Bakke with respect to admission to a state medical school. Although the
state may fix terms for enjoyment of government benefits, they may not be
"invidious" or "arbitrary" with respect to a particular claimant, such as
27
Bakke. 1
125. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (the "one man, one vote" case), and Harper v.
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down the Virginia poll tax) both sounded in equal
protection, at the same time identifying exercise of the franchise as a "fundamental right."
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), which led off a series of candidates'-access-to-theballot cases, was rested on associational (first amendment) and equal protection grounds.
Durational residence requirements for voting-Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) and
property and other conditions limiting exercise of the franchise-Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) used equal protection framework for their close-scrutinycompelling-state-interest requirements. So did Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), in striking down durational
residence requirements as impinging on the "fundamental right" to travel.
126. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972). As a historian he was accurate. The
Chief Justice's credentials as a prophet were damaged the next term, when two statutes were
upheld on grounds that the strict standard had been satisfied. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686
(1973) and Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973). Like Dunn, they involved residential
requirements for voting.
127. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Roth, it was noted that the Court has
"rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern
the applicability of procedural due process rights." 408 U.S. at 571. These cases, however,
were confined to establishing rights to a hearing, and did not adjudicate a substantive right to a
benefit.
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The development of the "any person" line, which we have just considered, and the "race" line which we saw earlier, partook of comparable
methodological ingredients. Both "fundamental right" and "suspect classifications" triggered a stricter measure of review than other constitutional
challenges to state action. These independent developments were considered
by the Court in its famous two-tier formula in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), which I discuss in the next
section.
V.

RECONCILIATION

OR PREFERENCE:

THE QUESTIONABLE IMPACT OF

CONSTITUTIONAL FORMULAS

A.

and the Two-Tier Formula
In Rodriguez, the problem arose because Texas' system of financing
public education, as in many states, depended significantly on local property
taxes. The amount spent for public education thus varied greatly, depending
on whether taxable property values in a given district were high or low.
Mexican-American parents of children attending public school in districts
having a low property tax base sued on behalf of children of poor families
residing in such districts. The district court held that plaintiffs had been
denied equal protection of the laws. The United States Supreme Court
reversed, with a 5-4 decision, in an opinion by Justice Powell.
The Court focused its inquiry into a rigid methodological framework.
When there was a "fundamental right" judicially declared to be recognized
by the Constitution, or a "suspect class," the compelling state interest test
would govern. Otherwise, the challenged state action would be measured by
1 28
the rational basis standard. This was the so-called "two-tier" formula.
Despite the central place of education, which the Court had recognized in
Brown, it declined here to find that education was a "fundamental right."
And James v. Valtierra129 had sufficiently determined that a "class of
RODRIGUEZ

128. "We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education
operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.
If so, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. If not, the Texas scheme must still
be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state
purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
129. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Indications that wealth/poverty might be such a basis were in
Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Some encouragement was derived from a
dictum in McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) ("lines ... drawn on
the basis of wealth or race . . .render a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a
more exacting judicial scrutiny," Id. at 807. Warren, C.J.). But, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971), and San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973), made
clear that wealth/poverty triggered no strict test of equal protection. The poor-as-poor were left
with a few special concessions in the appellate criminal process (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
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disadvantaged poor" did not qualify for the "suspect classification" category. Accordingly, the rational basis test applied. The Court had no difficulty in finding that this test was met by Texas in this case.
Since Rodriguez, the ranks of "suspect classes" to trigger "strict
scrutiny" and "compelling governmental interest" have remained closedlimited as before to race (including nationality) and alienage. 130
More important to our concerns here, the Rodriguez two-tier formula has
tended to make more mechanical the lawyers' argumentation and lowercourt decisions. It may have contributed to the wooden and error-laden
approach of the California and Washington courts in the Bakke and DeFunis
cases. These courts, and others like them, simply ask: "Is race involved?"
If it is, they assume there is a "suspect classification." Since the classification is "suspect," then "strict judicial scrutiny" (demanding a "compelling
state interest" and a less drastic, non-racial alternative) follows. Both
courts, as we have seen, got to this last step; however, they came to opposite
conclusions in the face of similar suggestions of what should be "compelling" state concerns. The litigants' assumption in Bakke, it is fair to
suspect, is that the Supreme Court will also reach this ultimate question. The
Court's disposition of Bakke, according to this expectation, will depend on
whether or not it views the interests advanced by the Regents to be "compelling." That expectation, however, is not reinforced by the above review
of equal protection development in the last three decades. That review
suggests that the Court should find there is no "suspect classification"
which can be relied on by Bakke, if the spirit of Brown still survives. As
Justice Marshall shrewdly pointed out in his Rodriguez dissent, 131 and
(1956), Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)), with the sixth amendment right to counsel
(Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)) and with the due process right to "meaningful
opportunity to be heard" when they are forced to settle basic claims in the judicial process.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
130. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), qualified aliens within the "suspect
classification" category. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 2120 (1977). Attempts
to elevate sex (or gender), and illegitimacy, to "suspect class" have failed, although clearly
classifications grounded in sex and illegitimacy are examined carefully.
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), a plurality seemed to have promoted "sex",
or "gender" (as some opinions prefer), to a "suspect class" requiring the strict test. But later
decisions made clear that this is not so. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975), Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
See also two cases from 1976 Term: Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 1021 (1977) and
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 1192 (1977).
As to illegitimacy, Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) dashed the expectations that had
been raised by the Court in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), but
they were somewhat revived in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 1459 (1977).
But see note 133 infra.
131. The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases fall into
one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review-strict
scrutiny or mere rationality. But the Court's decisions in the field of equal protection defy
such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it
has applied a spectrum of standards . . . . This spectrum clearly comprehends variations
in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications,
depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adverse-
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continues to remind us, 132 others-both lawyers and lower courts-may be
beguiled by the apparently mechanical two-tier equal protection formula
uttered in Rodriguez; but the Court itself has not been. 133
Preferencefor the Racial Line?
The fact remains that in the Brown era, the Court has given its most
extraordinary "equal protection" when the interests affected are racial
discrimination claims, and comparable stigmas that the Civil War Amendments were basically designed to eliminate. Such cases as the HunterJames 34 coupling, and Rodriguez135 itself, recognize more expansive
coverage where racial discrimination is concerned than otherwise. I shall
consider below some other illustrations of what may, in this sense, fairly be
called a preference for the "racial" over the "any person" line.
This "preference" does not, of course, flatly rule out an "any person"
claim such as proferred in Bakke. But, it does ordinarily deny to nonracial
plaintiffs the preferred status that derives from "suspect classification," and
requires them to establish "arbitrary" or "invidious" treatment in order to
trigger any constitutional equal protection relief.
B.

ly affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
characterization is drawn. . . .[I]t
will not do to suggest that the 'answer' to whether an
interest is fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis is always determined by
whether that interest 'is a right . . .explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.' San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-100.
132. See, e.g., his subsequent dissent in the 1975 term in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). Professor Gunther discerns that "[A] number of Justices,
from all segments of the Court, have sought formulations that would blur the sharp distinctions
of the two-tiered approach or that would narrow the gap between the levels of scrutiny."
GUNTHER, supra note 114, at 661. Gunther concedes that "Justice Marshall's 'sliding scale'
approach may explain many of the Burger Court's decisions", but he simply dismisses it as "a
formulation that the majority has refused to embrace." Id. There is a non-sequitur here. The
majority may continue to profess the two-tier formula, perhaps to minimize concern with too
much discretion, but Justice Marshall is trying to teach us what the justices really do in deciding
equal protection cases. We would do well to take the lesson, in which Justice White, at least,
concurs: See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (concurring opinion). Earlier, in
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court had ruled that
"In the area of economics and social welfare ... [i]t is enough that the State's action be
rationally based and free from invidious discrimination." 397 U.S. at 485. In dissent
Justice Marshall argued: " . . . [E]qual protection analysis of this case is not appreciably
advanced by the a priori definition of a 'right' fundamental or otherwise. Rather, concentration must be placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits
that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification
.
Id...at 520-21.
133. See the incisive analysis of Professor Gunther, in his Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I
(1972), and his updated version of that article. GUNTHER, supra note 114, at 657-67:
"[Flor the first time in years, old equal protection standards occasionally mean something
other than perfunctory opinions sustaining the law under attack. Increasingly, too, formulations of 'mere rationality' standards by some of the Justices have hinted at increased bite
to the scrutiny."
Id. at 661.
134. Supra notes 111 and 112.
135. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Three further examples of preference for the "race" line are: (1) the
136
limited revival of the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment,
(2) the enlarged interpretation given "statutory equal protection" of 42
U.S.C. § 1985 (3),137 and (3) the exceptional equal protection relief concerning multimember voting districts, 138 when racial discrimination is present and effective. A short treatment of these matters below is enough to
suggest continuing judicial concern to correct, where feasible, the costly
rigidities of the pre-Brown period.
Oregon v. Mitchell and Section 5 of the 14th Amendment
In upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965,139 which made extensive
intrusions on state provisions for voting, the Supreme Court relied on
Congress' enforcement power in section 2 of the fifteenth amendment, 14°
which was expressly directed to racial discrimination in voting. Katzenbach
v. Morgan14 1 was thought to have revived Congress' enforcement power
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (a section which had been a
dead letter since the Civil Rights Cases). 142 In Morgan, the Court upheld
congressional legislation that abolished the literacy test as applied to certain
Puerto Rican citizens of New York. Impelled by the apparent new life
breathed in section 5 by Morgan, Congress enacted a statute giving eighteen-year-olds the right to vote in national and state elections. In Oregon v.
Mitchell,'4 3 by a 5-4 vote, the national election provision was upheld.
However, the Court denied, by the same margin, Congress' power under
section 5 to provide eighteen-year-old voting in state elections. Faced with
the Morgan precedent, Justice Black (casting the controlling vote on both
1.

136. Congress' power under section five of the fourteenth amendment, the "enforcement"
clause (see note 8 supra), had been effectively stifled since the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883).
137. This civil rights statute, by its terms, secured "statutory" equal protection against
deprivation of rights by private conspiracies (the enacting Congress, in 1870, had the Ku Klux
Klan in view). However, the Court had construed the statute restrictively to avoid conceived
constitutional problems, These, too, derived from the Civil Rights Cases-the requirement of
"state action." Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1955).
138. Despite Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Reynolds v. Sims, 337 U.S. 533 (1964),
and their progeny (see text at notes 124-25 supra), the Supreme Court had shown no disposition
to insist on elimination of multimember districts for voting. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124 (1971). However, the Court intervened when race factors were added to the political
decision, and the consequences were to cancel out effective minority participation in the
electoral process. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
139. This significant statute, enacted pursuant to section 2 of the fifteenth amendment (see
note 7 supra), among other things, authorized use of federal voting examiners in recalcitrant
states, and thus made possible large scale minority registration and voting. The statute [79 Stat.
437, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. 1970)] was upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966).
140. See note 7 supra.
141.

384 U.S. 641 (1966).

142. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
143. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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state and national questions)' denied its applicability because Morgan
involved rectification of racial discrimination:
Where Congress attempts to remedy racial discrimination under its
enforcement powers, its authority is enhanced by the avowed intention of the framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments. 145
While the authority of this sentence is diminished by the fact that Justice
Black was speaking for himself and not for a majority of the Court, the
result in Oregon v. Mitchell remains the controlling pronouncement of the
Court with respect to Congress' power under section 5-and it is a fair
illustration of the preferred place that has been given race in the fourteenth
amendment scheme in the Brown era.
2. Griffin v. Breckinridge and Statutory "Equal Protection"
After the Civil War, one of the civil rights statutes, (now 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3), 146 provided remedies for conspiracies to deprive "any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws." In Collins v. Hardyman, 47 members of a
political club sought damages against American Legionnaires, who had
allegedly conspired to forcibly break up their meeting held in opposition to
the Marshall Plan. In affirming dismissal of the complaint, the Supreme
Court stated that section 1985(3) only reached those private conspiracies
that dominated or displaced state government. In fact, the Court said, if this
complaint did state a claim that met "the requirements of this Act, it raised
constitutional problems of the first magnitude." The Court assumed that this
Act of April 20, 1871, was subject to the requirement imposed by the Civil
Rights Cases;14 8 and, that congressional action under the fourteenth amendment was limited to remedying defects resulting from state involvement and
did not reach ordinary private conspiracies.
By 1971, the Court was no longer troubled with the constitutional authority for interpreting this same statute to reach private conspiracies. In Griffin
v. Breckinridge,19 plaintiffs were black citizens of Mississippi who alleged
that defendants, white Mississippians, had on racial grounds privately conspired to deprive them of "the equal protection of the laws" in violation of
section 1985(3). The lower courts dismissed the complaint on the authority
144. The peculiar alignment of the justices in Oregon v. Mitchell found four justices
supporting the legislation as applied to both federal and state elections, on various grounds, and
four justices rejecting the legislation as applied to federal and state elections. Justice Black

supported the eighteen-year old vote in federal elections, but found it unconstitutional as
applied to state elections. Within a year the twenty-sixth amendment had been passed and
ratified, applicable to both federal and state elections.
145. 400 U.S. at 129.
146.
147.

See note 137 supra.
341 U.S. 651 (1951).

148. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
149. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
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of Collins v. Hardyman. The United States Supreme Court reversed. It
found constitutional ground to invoke the statute, despite the absence of
state involvement, in the thirteenth amendment (following the Jones v.
Mayer' 50 analysis), and in the constitutional right to travel. 15' But the Court
put a curious caveat upon its now enlarged interpretation of this statute,
which was clearly phrased in the terminology of the fourteenth amendment
("equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws"). The Court seemed determined to reach its result without setting
a precedent that would make section 1985(3) an anchor point for the
development of an extensive federal tort law. It did so by specifying that
the language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal
privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus
behind the conspirators' action. 52
The Court, in a footnote, made its race point even clearer, in the robes of a
... 153
"We need not decide.
It is true that Griffin was concerned with statutory interpretation, and not
direct construction of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Nevertheless, this case is a further graphic illustration of the special
racial emphasis that has been given to "equal protection" as a constitutional
concept in the Brown era.
Voting Rights and "Invidious Discrimination"
The reapportionment-voting rights line of cases, starting with Baker v.
Carr,'54 initiated a marked increase in "any person" equal protection
litigation. But it did not at first have special interest in matters of race.
However, the problem of multimember districts eventually led the Court to
recognize, here too, the special significance of racial factors.
The concept that dilution of the "any person" vote by malapportioned
districts is not justifiable was first recognized in Baker v. Carr. Then, the
Court swiftly established "one person, one vote" as the constitutional
standard of equal protection. 55 The reapportionment cases, thereafter, were
concerned mainly with the percentage of permissible deviation from the
norm of equality, or with the kind of political subdivisions subjected to the
constitutional rule.' 56 Ultimately, the question arose as to the permissibility
3.

150. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See note 54 supra.
151. The "right to travel" had been noted as a "fundamental right" in several cases; see,
e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1%6).
152. Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S. at 102.
153. "We need not decide, given the facts ot this case, whether a conspiracy motivated by
invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be actionable under the portion of
Section 1985(3) before us." Id. at 102, n.9.
154. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
155. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1963) and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
156. More recent reapportionment cases have permitted a greater percentage deviation from
the "one-person-one-vote" ideal. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gaffney v. Cum-
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of multimember districts. Assume geographical area X is entitled to five
representatives in the state legislature. In X, group A has a 60% majority of
voters, but most of the 40% minority are concentrated in two localities
within X. With five members elected at large (multimember district), the
majority group will presumably elect all five. Whereas, if the area is divided
into five geographical units, the minority would ordinarily be able to elect
one or two representatives. When the Court was asked to declare multimember districts a per se violation of equal protection, it declined. 1 57 However,
the Court inserted dicta that was later to support a square holding: that a
multimember district would constitute an "invidious discrimination" provided it could be shown that "designedly or otherwise, a multimember
constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular
case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or
58
political elements of the voting population."
In Whitcomb v. Chavis,'159 the Court reversed a decision that upheld a
black voters' challenge to a multimember district. But, in White v. Regester,16° the Court unanimously struck down multimember districts in Texas
on findings that "the black community has been effectively excluded from
participation in the Democratic primary selection process," and that (in
another county) Mexican-Americans had been "invidiously excluded...
from effective participation in political life." However, the DorseyBurns' 6l dicta seems to have been vindicated only in part. The Court has
been resistant to using equal protection to police political gerrymandering. 162 And intonations in White v. Regester suggest that the "designedly or
otherwise" in Dorsey needs careful handling. Without expressly stipulating
that more than "impact" was required, the Court's opinion relies heavily on
the background of "history of official racial discrimination in Texas" as a
163
["purposeful?"] ingredient of the "invidious discrimination."
In this line of fourteenth amendment cases, the Court has again responded
more readily to alleged discrimination grounded in minority racial exclusion
than to complaints relying on nonracial grounds.
mings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). On the problem of political subdivisions, see Hadley v. Junior
College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
157. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
However, in Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975), the Court expressed more misgivings about
multimember districts than it had before, and directed that federal district courts not use them
in reapportionment plans which they fashion.
158. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). See also Burns v. Wilson, 384 U.S. 73, 88
(1966).
159. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
160. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).

161. See note 158 supra.
162. But racial gerrymandering of political districts is something else. See Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), where the Court used the fifteenth amendment as the striking
tool.

163.

White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 765-68.
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The ProperFocus for Decision in BAKKE
I have been suggesting that an assumption of the Civil War Amendments,
particularly the fourteenth amendment, involves two distinct lines of constitutional development that can illuminate the preferential minority admissions problem. Each line-the "race line" and what I have called the "any
person," nonracial line-has had its ups and downs, and these have not
always been interrelated. Where tension has occurred between the two lines,
particularly in the equal protection area, a preference has been accorded the
"race line." By that, I mean the Court has recognized a deeper commitment
to the racial line. This has been notably the case in the Brown era.
While the Brown era has coincided with a spawning of "fundamental
rights,"' 164 the Court seems to have drawn a halt on this agency of "any
person" development in Rodriguez. 165 Did the Rodriguez two-tier formula
in some way draw these two lines together for the first time? Even accepting
the Court's opinion at face value, this is hardly arguable. In Rodriguez the
Court takes the development in each line as it finds it, notes the applicability
of "strict scrutiny" to "suspect classifications" and to "fundamental
rights," and refuses to find a place for plaintiffs' claims in either category.' 66 Thus, it leaves them with a deferential, "rational basis," review of
the challenged state action. But, as Justice Marshall's dissent points out, the
Court has invariably, at least in recent years, made its equal protection
decisions only after evaluating the particular interests involved-private and
governmental-and then evaluating the impact of the challenged state action
upon these interests. 1 67 There is always a range of less close and closer
evaluation of these interests, even where plaintiff's claim does not fit within
a "suspect classification," or a "fundamental rights," envelope. Justice
White has expressly agreed with Justice Marshall that this is the way the
Court, in fact, acts.' 68 Examination of69the illegitimacy and gender-classification cases verifies their comments.1
The California court states that "the extension of a right or benefit to a
minority [has] the effect of depriving persons who were not members of 70a
minority group of benefits which they would otherwise have enjoyed."
The proper inquiry is whether the state's program, and action thereunder,
is "invidious" with regard to Bakke. Clearly there was no design or purpose
to exclude him, either because he was white (racial), or because of his
C.

164. See pp. 147-49 supra.
165. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
166. Supra note 128.
167. Supra note 131.
168. Supra note 132.
169. Supra note 130.
170. Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal. 3d at 46, 553 P.2d at 1160, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 688.
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particular ethnic background (national origin), whatever that may be. His
disadvantaged position is a by-product of an affirmative program of the
state, to admit a certain number of applicants from minority populations that
state decision-makers determined should have a certain place in the professional school. 17 '
The meaning accorded "invidious" in this context is surely the same as
that involved in discriminatory racial classifications, and this is directly tied
to the need to show more than discriminatory impact, or effect. It requires
showing of a purpose to stigmatize or demean. The following section
examines the Court's conclusive pronouncements to this effect.
1.

"Invidious" Discrimination: the Requirement of Racial Purpose

While discriminatory racial effect or impact is sufficient to make out a
violation of certain civil rights statutes, the Court has now established
beyond question that a discriminatory racial purpose is an essential ingredient of an equal protection violation grounded on race. Whatever uncertainty previously existed has been removed by Washington v. Davis'7 2 in 1976,
and United Jewish Organizationsof Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey173 in this
past term.
171. The California court seems to accept the legitimacy of the state program's objectiveincreased admission of minority applicants-and quarrel only with the preference given by
frank and open racial classification. Thus, the University "is entitled to consider, as it does now
with respect to applicants in the special program, that low grades and test scores may not
accurately reflect the abilities of some disadvantaged students." Id. at 54, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 694. It may properly consider other factors than tests and grades, "such as the
personal interview, recommendations, character, and matters relating to the needs of the
profession and society, such as the applicant's professional goals." Id. (emphasis added)
Further, said the court, "the University might increase minority enrollment by instituting
aggressive programs to identify, recruit, and provide remedial schooling for disadvantaged
students of all races." Id. Clearly the court's quarrel is not with the university's objectives to
increase minority enrollment for such educational, professional, and societal advantages as it
urges but, solely with the means used. "None of the foregoing measures can be related to race,
but they will provide for consideration and assistance to individual applicants who have
suffered previous disabilities, regardless of their surname or color." Id. The court's apparently
mechanical, but resolute, methodology thus becomes evident. By insisting that race used in this
affirmative way is still a "suspect class", it triggers the strict test, and forces the state to show
that it can achieve its objectives in no other way. This burden, says the court, has not even been
addressed: "So far as the record discloses, the University has not considered the adoption of
these or other nonracial alternatives to the special admission program." Id.
The court's insistence is also puzzling in light of its earlier statement that "although it is clear
that the special admission program classifies applicants by race, this fact alone does not render
it unconstitutional. Classification by race has been upheld in a number of cases in which the
purpose of the classification was to benefit rather than to disable minority groups." Id. at 46,
553 P.2d at 1160, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 688. California's effort to distinguish such cases as Swann v.
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), was discussed
supra text at notes 32-3.
172. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
173. 430 U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 996 (1977).
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a.

Washington v. Davis
In Washington v. Davis the Court grouped various disparate equal protection precedents on racial issues-from jury discrimination to school segregation and voting rights-around one unifying theme. That theme was the
requirement of a racially discriminatory purpose for an equal protection
racial violation. In Davis, unsuccessful black applicants for training as
police officers in the District of Columbia police department contended that
the test given applicants for entry into the training program was a racially
biased violation of equal protection. There was no allegation of discriminatory purpose. In fact, the test in question was a Civil Service Commission
test given throughout the government to measure verbal aptitude. The
district court denied relief, but the court of appeals reversed the lower court,
finding that the test violated equal protection, as well as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court,
on both constitutional and statutory grounds.
The court of appeals, counsel on both sides, and the several amici curiae,
assumed, without discussion, that the equal protection standard was identical to the standard under Title VII, and the case was briefed and argued on
that basis. Justice White's opinion for six members of a 7-2 Court pointed
out that the assumption was wrong, and that a disproportionate racial impact
was insufficient to ground an equal protection violation. Even the dissenters-Justices Brennan and Marshall who disagreed with the Court's statutory conclusion concerning Title VII-and Justice Stevens, concurring,
expressed no disagreement with the Court's insistence upon a showing of
discriminatory purpose.
While conceding that an "invidious discriminatory purpose may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact. . .that the
law bears more heavily on one race than another," the Court emphasized
that "disproportionate impact. . .standing alone" does not "trigger the
['strictest scrutiny'] rule," according to which challenged government action is made "justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations." 17' 4
Underscoring this point, Justice White listed in a footnote, and commented
on, several cases in the lower courts that had taken a different view:
To the extent that those cases rested on or expressed the view that
proof of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in7 making out
an equal protection violation, we are in disagreement.' 1
But is not the Bakke case distinguishable from Davis? In Davis, there
was no contention of any racial purpose at all in using the challenged general
test. In Bakke, the admission standards were explicitly fixed by consciously
selected racial factors. Does that not constitute the required racial purpose?
174. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
175. Id. at 245.
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Whatever the previous uncertainty, these questions clearly have been answered in the negative by a case decided one week after the grant of
certiorari in Bakke. United Jewish Organizationsof Williamsburgh, Inc. v.

Carey.

176

United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey

b.

In the UJO case, New York State sought to satisfy the Attorney General
that its planned redistricting complied with section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.177 In order to do so, the state allegedly used racial criteria to
establish substantial non-white majorities in two particular assembly districts and two senate districts. To achieve the desired sixty-five percent
minority voters in these districts, the state's 1974 redistricting legislation
split a closely-knit community of 30,000 Hasidic Jews (previously voting
together in one senate district and one assembly district) into two senate and
two assembly districts. The Jewish community sought a declaratory judgment that the legislation "would dilute the value of each plaintiff's franchise
by halving its effectiveness solely for the purpose of achieving a racial quota
and therefore [was] in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 1 78 The
Supreme Court affirmed, in a 7-1 decision (Justice Marshall not participating), the district court's decision denying relief.
The Court considered both constitutional and statutory bases for the
challenged legislation. The dominant opinion of Justice White denied plaintiffs relief, both because the New York statute was permissible under section
5 of the Voting Rights Act, and because it was permissible under the equal
protection clause (without considering any support from the statute). Our
interest here is the equal protection aspect.1 79 The Court recognized that
"the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner" in its redistricting
plan. However, the opinion distinguished between purposeful use of a racial
criterion and what the Court called "discriminatory purpose." Since the
state's plan "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to white or
any other race. . .we discern no discrimination violative of the Fourteenth
80
Amendment."1
176.

430 U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 996 (1977). The grant of certiorari in Bakke is at 430 U.S. -,

97

S.Ct. 1098 (1977).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1965), as amended by Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 5, 84 Stat. 315. A state subject to its provisions (as New York was,
because of having used a "discriminatory test or device" in counties where fewer than fifty
percent had voted) that wished to change its voting arrangements had to secure approval either
from the district court of the District of Columbia, or from the Attorney General. New York
had taken the latter route.
178. United Jewish Org'ns of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 97 S.Ct. at 1003.
179. Section 5 had been interpreted only the previous term, in Beer v. United States, 425
U.S. 130 (1976). That case had held that a voting procedure change would be valid so long as it
would not "lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise." 425 U.S. at 141. Justice White's inability to
command a majority in support of the section 5 part of his opinion apparently derived from
some concern he was undercutting Beer (in which he had dissented).
180. United Jewish Org'ns of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 97 S.Ct. at 1009-1010.
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It is hard to put the matter more clearly. Interestingly, while a majority of
the Court subscribed to the above equal protection position, only four
justices accepted that portion of the opinion which upheld the New York
statute because of power derived from the Voting Rights Act. Justices
White, Stevens and Rehnquist expressly joined in the equal protection part
of the opinion. Justices Stewart and Powell, in a separate concurrence,
indicated agreement with the equal protection views set out above:
Under the Fourteenth Amendment the question is whether the reapportionment plan represents purposeful discrimination against white
voters. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). . . . That the
legislature was aware of race when it drew the district lines might
also suggest a discriminatory purpose. Such awareness is not, however, the equivalent of discriminatory intent. The clear purpose with
which the New York Legislature acted. . .forecloses any finding
that it acted with the invidious purpose of discriminating against
white voters.' 8
These decisions of the Court leave little doubt that the California Supreme
Court asked the wrong questions in Bakke. The Supreme Court would ask:
"Did the University's use of race as an explicit factor in admissions
invidiously-that is, purposely and demeaningly-discriminate against
Bakke?" The California court, I shall now recall, was more mechanically
inclined.
2.

The Supreme Court's Touchstone Applied

The California court's conclusion in Bakke is the simple addition of two
factors: (1) racial classification, plus (2) "the effect of depriving persons. . . of benefits which they otherwise would have enjoyed."' 8 2 The
opinion states flatly that "where the [racial] classification results in detriment to a person because of his race, " 18 3 the product is "suspect classification." This in turn entails "strict scrutiny" and the "compelling state
interest"-"no less drastic means" test.'94
181.

Id. at 1017.

182. Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976).
183. Id. at 49, 553 P.2d at 1162, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 690. In resolving the question of
"compelling state interest", the California court was following mechanically the analytical
model indicated by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But in contrast to
Roe, where the Court described the woman's abortion decision as an aspect of the "fundamental right" of privacy, there is here no basis for triggering the strict test at all. In San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1(1973), the Court specified that the strict test
applied only when state action "operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges
upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." 411 U.S. at 17.
The California court felt that the mere existence of a "racial classification" was the necessary
trigger. I have argued that this premise is wrong, and, therefore, that the strict test is not
applicable. Consequently, there is no need to take sides on the conflict of views between the
California and Washington courts over whether the state-offered reasons to justify minority
preference admissions are constitutionally "compelling."
184. The Washington court had committed the same error. It too allowed the effect,
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Why did DeFunis or Bakke fail to secure a valued seat in professional
school? Was it:
(1) because there was no room after admitting those ranked ahead
of them in the general admissions line, and admitting those specially
admitted in the minority preference line?
Or was it:
(2) because some restrictive quota had been set to exclude, or
invidiously limit, the admissions of a group of which they were
members (say exclusion of Central Europeans as a result of a Western European-Hispanic-American-black coalition, which for the moment dominated admissions policy in Washington or California)?
Should it make a difference in equal protection analysis if the reason for
their nonadmission was (2) rather than (1)? The California court says "no."
In either case the effect, and therefore the constitutional result, is the same.
I argue "yes." In (2) there is a clear "racial," "national" or "ethnic"
exclusion. There is true "invidious" discrimination in the original, and only
useful, constitutional use of the word.' 85 In (2) they are excluded, not as a
by-product (effect) of a governmental decision that was neutral as to them
among all non-minority citizens, as in (1), but because they or their group
were affirmatively singled out for exclusion. And this distinction is constitu86
tionally crucial. 1
D.

Some Controlling Certainties

From the above developmental history, of which it is only too aware, the
Court will isolate some controlling certainties.
1. The paradigm of the "suspect class" is race, and "the main
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause [is] the protection against
racial discrimination.
.. "7 That is, principally, but not exclusively, the black race.
2. No classification by race whose purpose is "invidious" dischargeable to a well-intentioned racial classification, to force the university to prove that the
racially classified admissions program furthered a "compelling state interest."
185. A significant reason for confusion with respect to "suspect" classifications, is the
occasional departure from the original, and authentic use of "invidious", as demeaning.
186. This distinction in no way relies on such vulnerable arguments as the following, which
have been made to support preferential admissions: that race is "suspect" only when it
disadvantages blacks (historical background of fourteenth amendment (see note 12 supra)); that
a classification is "suspect" only when it is fashioned by a majority with respect to a "discrete
insular minority" (see note 115 (par. 3) supra), translated to mean, in this connection, by whites
with respect to blacks (see Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U.
CHI. L. REV. 723, 729 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ely]), and never by whites to the deprivation
of whites.
187. While "invidious" was used in this context, at the outset, in the sense of demeaning,
disparaging, stigmatic-it has been used frequently in a blander, almost conclusory sense,
simply to signify that conduct is constitutionally objectionable. I use "invidious" here in the
earlier and purer sense. It seems that the Court has of late done likewise. See United Jewish
Org'ns of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. at 1009-1010.
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crimination against the black race has been upheld since Brown v.
Board of Education; and presumably, none will be. 'I
3. The qualifying clauses (admitted in McLaughlin' s9 and Loving"9 ) opened the door, after "strict scrutiny," to a showing of
"compelling governmental interest." But they left no place for any
statute that invidiously discriminated against the black race, or any
other race or nationality. Presumably, perhaps regrettably, these
qualifiers were designed to leave the door open for another
Korematsu, which Justice Black had been insistent to label a special
war power decision-not a racial one.19'
4. The notion of "suspect class" originated in the context of race,

and for many years race was alone in the class. It has been joined
only by "alienage,"1

92

and recent cases make it clear that the protec-

93
tion afforded aliens is of a lower rank.1

5. The root of the concept, "suspect class," is purposeful damage
to members of the class singled out for discriminatory state action,
whether the damage be economic, psychological or social. With
regard to the blacks whom the fourteenth amendment was especially
designed to protect, "suspect class" resonates, above all, stigma

and deprivation of civil rights'94-in addition to loss of economic

opportunity. In Rodriguez, 95 the Court, through Justice Powell,
identified "the traditional indicia of suspectness:"
188. "At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications,
especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subject to the 'most rigid scrutiny', . . . and, if
they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of
some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the
object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at ii.
(emphasis added).
189. A law "which trenches upon the constitutionally protected freedom from invidious
official discrimination based on race . . . though enacted pursuant to a valid state interest,
bears a heavy burden of justification . . . and will be upheld only if necessary, and not merely
rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." McLaughlin v. Florida,

379 U.S. at 196.

190. See note 188 supra.

191. Of course, despite Justice Black's protestations (supra note 77), Korematsu did uphold
a racial classification. It remains a precedent that might again justify a classification invidious
on racial grounds. In his DeFunis dissent, Justice Douglas recalled that "We were advised on
oral argument that if the Japanese landed troops on our west coast nothing could stop them west
of the Rockies. The military judgment was that, to aid in the prospective defense of the West
Coast, the enclaves of Americans of Japanese ancestry should be moved inland, lest the
invaders by donning civilian clothes would wreck even more serious havoc on our western
ports. The decisions were extreme and went to the verge of war time power; and they have been
seriously criticized. It is, however, easy in retrospect to denounce what was done, as there
actually was no attempted Japanese invasion of our country." DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
at 339.
192. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
193. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 425 U.S. 67 (1976); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S.
86 (1973). But cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973), Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), and Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. -, 97
S.Ct. 2120 (1977).
194. United Jewish Org'ns of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S.-, 97 S.Ct. 996 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-

tan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 452 (1977).
195. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1(1973).
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a class. . .saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process. 96
6. The "suspect class" category is clearly available to races and
nationalities other than blacks upon a showing of purposeful discrimination. However, there is no suggestion in the annals of the
Court that the notion of "suspect class" is available to non-minority
group members to trigger the overwhelming advantage of strict
scrutiny-compelling state interest, and to set aside majoritarian policy enacted in behalf of the minority. (Surely this would be another
species of what Justice Powell fairly identified as "extraordinary
protection"l9). Yet the contrary view is the nub of the ruling of the
California court in Bakke. It does not wash with history, or with the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
VI. WHY NOT AFFIRM?
While the decisional indications strongly suggest that Bakke will be
reversed, and possibly by a unanimous Court, it is of course conceivable
that the Supreme Court will affirm. To do so, however, it must formulate a
constitutional principle that has been unarticulated to date. Such a step
would require a hard look at policy considerations, at large constitutional
principles and at the practical implications of setting sail on a new constitutional course. Why not affirm the California court? Which major policy
concerns may be urged for affirmance, and which for reversal?
Clearly the Court can find the preferential admissions program "invidious, " and therefore rule it a constitutionally impermissible governmental
purpose for a state university to use race as an element in its decision not to
include an otherwise qualified individual on its lists of admittees.
This determination of constitutional policy should be made by the Court
only after consideration of the factual context and previous decisional
materials. For purposes of the analysis in this section, I assume that previous
decisions do not point to a conclusion that this program is "invidious," but
rather point to quite the opposite. 1 98 Therefore, the reconsideration of
constitutional policy must be conducted in light of analogies to other
influential constitutional positions that arguably have been accepted. Further, it must be reconsidered in light of demonstrable or predictable consequences that make one conclusion constitutionally preferable (e.g. to brand
the program constitutionally "invidious") to its opposite.
We now turn to constitutional policy arguments that may be tendered in
favor of affirmance of Bakke and that support the position that preferential
admissions should be ruled "invidious."
196. Id. at 28.
197. Supra note 196.
198. Supra text at notes 172-181.
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1. The constitutional postulate that the fourteenth amendment applies to "any person" entails that each individual must be judged on

his own merits and ability, and not on the basis of any preferential
category fixed by the state.199

2. The Constitution is "color blind." The aim of the state universities should not be to produce black lawyers or black doctors for
blacks, but to produce good lawyers and doctors for Americans. 2°°

3. The preferential admissions program is "invidious" because
non-racial means were available and untried-i.e. adoption of more
flexible admissions standards with non-racial
factors, and more ag20 1
gressive recruiting of minority students.
4. Although a racial classification is considered permissible per se,
race is no more relevant to the purpose of medical
or legal education
20 2
than wealth was relevant to voting in Harper.
5. "The divisive effect of such preferences..." raises serious
doubts about whether the advantages obtained by
the preferred few
20 3
are worth the inevitable cost to racial harmony.

Without making detailed refutation of these contentions, some comments
are in order. 2°4 Despite the "any person" scope of the fourteenth amendment, the individual's right to hold a public job or to be admitted to a
profession (and analogically to be admitted to qualify for either) are not
absolute. They are subject to some public (state) limitations that may bear
hard on certain persons. 20 5 Since the "color-blind" approach was rejected
when proposed in 1896, by Justice Harlan, 2" it becomes a species of
"Catch 22" when it is now raised in opposition to state efforts to remedy the
effects of its earlier rejection. The "alternatives" (No. 3) inferentially
suggest that admissions officials should come up with sophisticated nonracial formulae to achieve the same result; further, they should be more
competitive in obtaining a fair share of the small minority pool of applicants
that can qualify in open competition. The last two suggestions must be faced
199. Cf. Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal.3d at 50, 553 P.2d at 1163,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
200. Cf. Id. at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693, quoting from Justice Douglas'
dissent in DeFunis.
201. Cf. Id. at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
202. Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
203. Cf. Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal.3d at 62, 553 P.2d at 1171,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
204. The California court cited the Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) statement:
"The rights created by the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the
individual. The rights established are personal rights." It might well have quoted Reynolds v.
Sims, (supra note 125), or many other cases for the incontestable proposition. But the argument
begs the question at issue: do Bakke's personal constitutional rights have the amplitude he
claims for them?
205. For a recent example, see Massachusetts State Bd. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976),
where a state law compelling retirement at sixty, from a public job, was upheld against the equal
protection challenge of a "person" physically and mentally capable of satisfactory job performance.
206. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 559.
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squarely in the context of the entire situation. Throughout this catalog of
reasons runs a current of desirability (choice on individual merit, colorblindness, minimization of diversity and divisive effect) that does not
compel constitutional decision one way or the other. Bakke argues that
equality requires that his credentials now be fully honored across-the-board.
The state preferential admissions program opts for preference now (for
sixteen per cent of the vacancies) to some disadvantaged minorities, so that
after the program has borne fruit, there may be a realistic equality of
opportunity for all. The choice of "now," as plaintiff urges, or "later," as
the university counters, is preeminently a question within the permissible
bounds of local and state determination.
After the first draft of this article had been prepared, Justice Brennan
sensitively raised some additional questions concerning "benign" discrimination in United Jewish Organizationsof Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey,207
which demand attention in the present context.
6. Apparently "benign" treatment may in fact have illicit, rather
than truly benign purposes. 2 8 For example, some disadvantaged
groups might be preferred at the expense of others-as where a
program in Texas might favor Mexican-Americans at the expense of
blacks or Indians, and a program in Ohio might favor blacks at the
expense of Puerto Ricans.
The possibility of illicit discriminatory purpose is present once a preferential minority program is permitted; that must be conceded. But this should
not be taken as a ground for eliminating benefits to all minorities. The
difficult problem of line-drawing could well be left to the states, saving the
federal equal protection right to complain when a demonstration of illicit
2°9
purpose, as well as effect, can be made. Washington v. Davis.
7. "Preferential treatment may act to stigmatize its recipient
groups [and] imply to
some the recipients' inferiority and especial
210
need of protection."
One must deal with this objection with great care. The words "stigmatize" and "inferiority," as used in this context, are in particular need of
clarification in lieu of the legal history of race relations in the United States.
After the rocky history from the Civil Rights Cases211 and Plessy2 12 to
207. 97 S.Ct. at 1012-1014.
208. Id. at 1013: "[A] purportedly preferential race assignment may in fact disguise a policy
that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of the plan's supposed beneficiaries. Accordingly,
courts might face considerable difficulty in ascertaining whether a given race classification
truly furthers benign rather than illicit objectives. . . . And if judicial detection of truly benign
policies proves impossible or excessively crude, that alone might warrant invalidating any racedrawn line."
209. 426 U.S. 411 (1976).
210. United Jewish Org'ns of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. at 173-74, 97 S.Ct. at
1014.
211. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
212. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Brown, 213 we seem to have emerged in our law to the position that the
richness and worth of each human person, as well as his or her superiority or
inferiority, is measured not by race, not by economic resources and not by
educational qualification. When working people were in "especial need of
protection," many fought for, and accepted, the governmental sanction of
protected unionization. To this day, some working people do not see this as
a "benefit" and do not want it. Yet they may be subjected to "majority
rule." 214 Undoubtedly, some blacks, Hispanic-Americans and Indians do
not want preferential treatment, possibly on the grounds cited in this objection. But when governmental policy decides that past deprivation has made
present preference an indispensable tool of effective personhood and citizenship---as in many determinations made primarily in the line of governmental
policy-some individual costs are present.
8. It is a "social reality that even a benign policy of assignment by
race is viewed as unjust by many in our society, especially by those
individuals who are adversely affected in a given classification. 215
As a social reality, this objection must be conceded. But it is hardly solid
ground for a constitutional barrier by the Court to any program that is
otherwise constitutional. The doors are open to such objectors to bring
political and legal pressures to bear in their states against instituting and
continuing preference programs. Practically speaking, the minorities do not
have comparable recourses open to them if a constitutional red light terminates the possibility of such programs. The green light simply leaves to the
states an ongoing judgment. Employers, as a group, were adversely affected
by national labor policy that required them to deal with recognized labor
unions. The progressive income tax fell especially on a particular group of
economically advantaged. Like those who would be disadvantaged by
preferential admissions, these hard-hit groups were left with possible repeal
as the only further avenue of objection. It is a "social reality;" but independent constitutional basis apart ("invidiousness," "arbitrariness" or nonrationality), this plight is simply the democratic process at work in a federal
system.
Contrary constitutional policy considerations that must be considered
before erecting a definitive constitutional barrier to these controversial
programs include the following:
a.

Considerations of general constitutional significance.
(1). Federalism and local control.
Counseling against expanding constitutional restraints here are traditional
considerations of federalism and the Court's recent reserve against extend213. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
214. For the effect in labor law of majority rule upon members of the bargaining unit who
want no part of any union, see J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 335 (1944).
215. United Jewish Org'ns of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 173-74, 97 S.Ct. at
1014.
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ing national dominance to areas such as public employment and education,
which have traditionally been local concerns. 2 16 Many of the considerations
that follow are specifications of this larger theme.
(2). Flexibility in a time dimension.
Legislation and administration are better adapted than constitutional judicial decisions to furnish the flexibility required by a program whose legitimacy derives from local support and perception of changing needs and
conditions. Again, there is no constitutional mandate for "now" rather than
"later.'"
(3). Varying responses in different states and localities.
A program as controversial as preferential minority admissions evokes
varied popular responses in different states. In one, there may be greater
concern with generosity to minority groups or perceived social injustice; in
another, there may exist a more individualist ("any person") bent. The
California Supreme Court (or Washington's) should be free to declare such a
program a violation of its own state constitution, rather than evoking a
national constitutional inhibition. The political process should be permitted
its restraints.
(4). The Constitution mandates no specific theory of justice.
Different theories of justice are in conflict in the debate over preferential
minority admissions. One theory of individual justice is rooted in an individual's superior current ability relative to others. Another approach to
justice gives place to laying ground for greater future egalitarianism. The
Constitution makes no fixed choice of any one theory. Clear "invidiousness" or "arbitrariness" apart, the states should have room for divergent
choice among them.
b. Considerations relating to inconsistency with constitutional policies
already established (herein of "race" since Brown.)
(1). The historic purpose of equal protection, long judicially accepted.
There has been, since Brown, unswerving acceptance of the postulate
that the fourteenth amendment was enacted primarily to remove the vestiges
7
of slavery.

21

Brown, and its agonizing successor cases, have recognized this postulate
in increasing arenas of public action-but in none so forcibly as education,
216. See Massachusetts State Bd. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) and National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), for recent expressions by the Court.
217. This does not resolve the disputed historical questions as to the total intentions of the
framers of the fourteenth amendment. See note 12 supra. Nor does it confront the doubts
confessed by the Court in Brown v. Board of Educ. as to the specifics of the amendment's
aspirations in the race line. This paper has proceeded on the facts that (1) the Court has actually
interpreted the fourteenth amendment in terms of the two lines, or principles, discussed herein;
and (2) since Brown, the Court has recognized that the race line is paramount (as SlaughterHouse had, with questionable designs). See notes 9 and 54 supra.
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the key to full participation in the republic. The intense national experience
in viewing "Roots" on television has portrayed to a broader audience than
ever before the fact that educational retardation has been imposed on
generations of Americans and (I would add) that more than generosity is
now at stake here.2 18 The Court is asked to fashion a constitutional obstacle
to entering those professions and public universities which are aware of the
need to get on with the catch-up. This is hardly in the spirit of Brown.
(2). The Supreme Court's use of affirmative corrective measures.
In education decisions following Brown, the Court has insisted upon
affirmative correction to the extent of imposing serious inconvenience upon
non-minority children and their parents and has used explicit racial classifi219
cations in the process.
The Court has stood by its position in face of serious social disturbances,
derived from white majority protest at220 the deprival of their freedom of
choice to attend neighborhood schools.
(3). The Supreme Court's emphasis on discriminatory purpose.
The Court has hesitated to impose corrective measures where there has
been no showing of discriminatory state purpose causing segregation in
education. 22 1 In lawyers' parlance, it has moved against de jure, but not de
facto, segregation.2 22 The Court has also declined to fashion constitutional
rules requested by blacks when the state laws and regulations have dis223
criminatory racial impact, but no discriminatory racial purpose.
(4). Absence of judicial precedent against ameliorative state action.
There is an affirmative message in the fact that the United States Supreme
Court has not rebuffed ameliorative state action in behalf of racial minorities
since 1878.224
218.

See, e.g. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83-90 (1971); Michelman, Foreword: On

Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Morris,
Equal Protection, Affirmative Action and Racial Preferencesin Law Admissions, 49 WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1973).
219. Consider, with reference to the Swann remedies (supra note 69) Professor Ely's
argument: "Children can be hurt by busing, not simply by the inconvenience of the transportation process itself, but also by the transition from a school environment in which they have
grown secure to strange surroundings in which they are likely to find themselves in a racial
minority for the first time . . . .The fact remains that busing hurts people precisely because of
their color." Ely, supra note 186, at 724.
220. A recent case in point is the Court's denial of certioriari in the fall of 1976 in the Boston
busing case.
221. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
222. See note 72 supra.
223. Washington v. Davis, 427 U.S. 229(1976). Recall the Court's hospitable enforcement of
the fair employment practice statute (Title VII) as to back pay and seniority. Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Consider
also the expansive reading given the thirteenth amendment since Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409
(1968) (supra note 54).
224. But cf. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878), where the Supreme Court struck down, on
commerce clause grounds, a Louisiana statute prohibiting racial segregation on common carriers within the state.
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c. Considerations of predictable social and educational developments in
light of an affirmance of Bakke.
(1). Anticipated decrease, rather than increase in participation of blacks
and other minorities in at least the two professions considered in DeFunis
and Bakke would result, with comparable anticipated effect in other areas
where higher education is the key to entry.
The suggestion by the California Supreme Court of increased recruiting as
a viable alternative to the preference plan 225 borders on the "irrational."
Demonstrably, the problem is the non-availability of a pool of blacks and
other minorities that at present can compete with whites for available seats.
Recruiting would serve to attract some to School A as against School B,
which did not recruit "vigorously"; still, it would not increase the overall
participation of minorities. The question of likely decrease of black and
other minority participants in medical and legal education in face of an
affirmance of Bakke led to attempts at empirical verification. One survey,
conducted by North Carolina Central University Law School (see Appendix
infra), asked a single question of 130 law schools and 120 medical schools
with respect to the five-year period 1972-1977: "How many actual minority
admittees would probably have qualified for admission on your general
admission standards, if there had been no preferential admission plan? 226 The
medical school responses were fragmentary and were not compiled. Howev225. Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal.3d at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 694.
226. The summary of Chart I (set out in the Appendix) tells the first part of the story. In
1976-77 there would have been only 80 Blacks entering 42 reporting law schools that enrolled
11,656 1st year prospective members of the bar. The Blacks were, therefore, only /, of 1%
(.0075) of the total entering law students. The methodology of the NCCU survey, conducted
in March of 1977, demonstrates that these figures are solidly representative, because the
reporting law schools constitute an unusually precise sample of the universe of American legal
education. In 1975-76 there would have been only 72 Blacks among 8448 entering law students.
(.0085); in 1974-75 only 64 out of 8357 (.0077); in 1973-74 only 42 out of 6511 (.0065); and
in 1972-73 only 33 out of 5159 (.0064). In the three-year period from 1974-76 only 216 Blacks
would enter these law schools out of 27,444 (.0078). Extrapolating this figure against the total
Istyear nation-wide law enrollment for these three years of 117,108, there would have been a
total of 913 Black law students entering, an average of 304 for each year. These last figures
include those admitted to the four predominantly Black law schools in the United States:
Howard University in Washington, D.C.; North Carolina Central University in Durham, North
Carolina; Southern University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Texas Southern University, in
Houston, Texas.
The same story may be told in another way by comparing the number of Blacks actually
admitted with those who would have been admitted if they had been forced to run the general
admissions (LSAT-GPA) gamut. The summary of Chart II (which, like Chart I, is set out in the
Appendix) makes this point-that without special minority admissions only 11.19% of the
Blacks actually enrolled would have been given a seat in law school. And, instead of the 1383
Black 1st year law students who did enter the reporting schools in the three-year period 1974-76,
only 139 (12.36%) would have answered the first roll call in Torts-if uniform general admission
standards using prevailing LSAT-GPA criteria were enforced. Comparable results ensue when
the NCCU survey addresses the standpoint of Indians, Hispanic-Americans, and other
minorities whose hypothetical fate was similarly tested.
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er, a net 40% return came from the law schools. In 1974-77 if special
minority admissions had not been used in the reporting schools, instead of
1383 black students actually enrolled in the Ist year class, there would have
been only 171, or 12.36% of the actual figure. If the figures are limited to
the single year 1976-77, 78 would have been admitted instead of the actual
697 (11.19%). (See Chart II of Appendix, where these NCCU survey results
are elaborated and explained.) Taking the same three-year period 1974-77,
if special minority admissions were not used, but the prevailing variations of
LSAT-GPA ratings, there would have been only 216 black students admitted to entering classes out of a total 1st year enrollment in those schools of
27,444. That means that only 78/100 of 1% of entering law students would
have been black, as compared to the present (unsatisfactory) 2% black
lawyer representation in the national lawyer population, and 11% black
representation in the total population. (See Chart I of Appendix.)
(2). An affirmance of Bakke, unless carefully qualified in its terms,
would decrease professional educational opportunities for blacks far beyond
their non-admission on preference grounds to predominantly white schools.
Such a decision would raise serious question as to the continued existence
of predominantly black schools. For example, there are four law schools in
the country that presently fall into this category. So long as there is a
pressing demand for admission to the legal and medical professions, such
schools may succumb, following a constitutional rule against a preferential
admissions policy that was calculated to salvage a reasonable opportunity
for the professional education for black students. At the very least, such a
decision would raise serious doubts in these schools concerning the implications of improving the quality of professional education for minority students. For as education improves at the now predominantly black school,
the number of non-minority applicants with higher scores increases. 227 In
time perhaps, the "better" predominantly black schools would become, like
the others, predominantly white. Justice Douglas' suggestion in his DeFunis
dissent for a result-oriented admissions test that would make possible substantial minority entrance "on non-racial grounds" is a non-viable alterna228
tive, which raises Disneyesque recollections-of Mickey Mouse.
227. See Note, Alternative Schools for Minority Students: The Constitution, The Civil Rights
Act and the Berkeley Experiment, 61 CAL. L. REV. 858 (1973); Canby, "Northern" School
Segregation: Minority Rights to Integrate and Segregate, 1971 L. & Soc. ORD. 489.
The reality of the problem suggested in the text may be verified from admission statistics of
such schools, in a period of continuing demand for seats in state law and medical schools. This
sensitive problem suggests solution by political give-and-take, with all its unpredictability,
rather than by final judicial solution on per se, or other, constitutional grounds.
228. The California court, borrowing directly from the Douglas dissent, recommends this
unattractive alternative. Supra note 171.
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Considerations of whether the Brown heritage has a future.
Beyond history and case law lies the fact that the United States Supreme
Court has taken seriously the Brown heritage. It is worth considering the
bizarre posture that would result from the Court's interpreting its materials
in any other way than to require reversal of Bakke. In light of what that
heritage has been, an affirmance could well signal a new era in constitutional race relations, post-Brown, with perhaps a slogan of its own: "each
person for one's self." To make this point, first a recap, and then a few
illustrations.
(1). The argument to date.
Brown is a landmark in our history. On that date in 1954 the Supreme
Court dramatically reaffirmed something that was not new, but had long
been forgotten in practice-that the fourteenth amendment had been passed
principally to restore to black citizens the dignity and right to equality in
citizenship of which they had been deprived. Timidly at first, but resolutely,
the Court insisted on nonsegregated equality in education, and then, almost
at once, in all public facilities. After an overpatient start, the Court finally
insisted, at some cost to other citizens and to its own acceptability, upon
implementing educational integration. It has not yet succeeded in its goal,
and perhaps it is slowing down too soon, but it has kept both the principle
and goal aloft. Meanwhile, in the spirit of Brown, it has struck down
previously tolerated legislation that impinged on that dignity and full citizenship of blacks, often waving the standard of race as a "suspect class." In
this same spirit came effective national legislation, for the first time in threequarters of a century, which made voting a reality and gave a realistic hope
of removing discrimination in employment and housing. Overwhelmingly,
the Court interpreted and enforced this legislation in the spirit of Brown. In
the spirit of Brown the Court gave an expansive interpretation of the
constitutional bases of the civil rights acts, finding new constitutional
authority in the thirteenth amendment, the commerce clause, and the constitutional right to travel.
In this same spirit, professional and educational groups in public and
private sectors recognized the need to help qualify the long-neglected black
citizens for leadership and professional service. Thus the preferential admission programs were born-beyond the requirements of Constitution or
statute. To their credit, these professional persons and educators saw their
programs as filling a national need-in the spirit of Brown.
(2). The new incongruities.
If the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, out of which
Brown was finally born, is now grasped to extinguish its spirit, consider
some incongruities with which we shall have to live.
d.
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(a). The members of the white majority will have used the "suspect
class" doctrine, developed to prevent indignities and deprivations to blacks,
to eliminate possibilities of black training for leadership, fuller citizenship
and professional responsibility. A student note, written when DeFunis was
being considered, stated the dilemma well:
It would be ironic indeed if a standard of review (strict scrutiny/compelling state interest) which was developed to help end discrimination against members of minority groups were used to ban state
practices designed to alleviate the effects of that very discrimination.229
Ironic is an understatement, indeed. Before asking the lawyer's question"Can you prove that there was actually de jure discrimination in this or that
medical or law school?'"-consider another bizarre consequence of a mechanical affirmance of Bakke.
(b). The advantages of not being included in a "suspect class" will
prove to be greater than the advantages of being, like blacks, clearly
included. Recall that both Justice Douglas and the California Supreme Court
urged admission procedures that would favor the underprivileged, as such,
but not on grounds of race.2 10 In Rodriguez,231 underprivileged citizens in
Texas sought to invoke the "suspect class" formula. The Court said, "no."
Empoverishment or minority status does not trigger membership in a "suspect class." "Suspect class" has a very special origin: race and the deprivations visited upon the minority blacks. But Justice Douglas, and the California court, would bar members of the "suspect class" from special privileges
in admissions, and at the same time welcome non-members to such
privileges, without running the gauntlet of strict scrutiny. If the law should
become such a word game, the cost would be great to the "constitutionally"
disadvantaged. But there is more. Consider the Indians.
(c). Preferential treatment for Indians, firmly upheld by the United
States Supreme Court, and rightly so, makes incongruous the denial of
preferences to blacks. The Supreme Court, alone among governmental
branches, has a long and honorable record of sympathetic response to the
229. Note, Ameliorative Racial Classifications Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1973
L.J. 1126, 1149.
The crucial nature of the preferential admissions problem is evidenced by an expanding
literature. Among studies not already cited are: A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 61-88 (1976); Karst and Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal
Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955 (1974); Lavinsky, DeFunis v. Odegaard: the "Non Decision"
With a Message, 75 COL. L. REV. 520 (1975); O'Neil, PreferentialAdmissions, 80 YALE L.J. 699
(1971); O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REV.
925 (1974); R. O'NEIL, DISCRIMINATING AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (1975); Posner, The DeFunis
Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT.
REV. 1 (1974); Sandalow, Racial Preferences and Higher Education: Political Responsibility and
the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975).
230. See notes 48 and 171, pp. 132, 135 supra.
231. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See text at note 128 supra.
DUKE
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grievances and claims of Indian tribes. In Morton v. Mancari,2 32 the
obvious constitutional challenge was made to a federal program of employment preferences in the Bureau of Indian Affairs-for "suspect classification" of race. The legislative judgment was left undisturbed by Justice
Blackmun, speaking for a unanimous Court. All kinds of reasons were
given: it was not a racial preference at all, but only applied to tribes; the
tribes had to be federally recognized, so it was a political, not a racial
preference; it was limited to employment only in the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, whose legal status was "truly sui generis." But the bottom line was
"the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians" 233 -a
truly solid and responsible reason. Now, there is no history of treaties with
blacks, nor of a guardian-ward status, as is the case with the Native
Americans. But what is the meaning of all those pronouncements the Court
has made, antedating the Brown period but repeatedly made in recent years,
that blacks are indeed central to the purpose and remedies of the fourteenth
amendment?2 3 1 While all others are protected by "equal protection," is
there not room for a "preferred position" here too? On what constitutional
theory will the Court refuse to match judicial concern for article I, section 8,
clause 3,235 and the Indians, by a comparable updated concern for amendment fourteen and the blacks? I have no doubt that an opinion setting out
such distinguishing theory could be written. After all, there are different
constitutional concerns. My question is, would it be credible?
(d). Consider again the impact of an affirmance of Bakke on the
predominantly black school. If the California court's rationale were accepted, banning any use of race as a criterion for admission, such schools
(especially professional schools in a period of demand) might well lose their
identity. More to our point, they might be unable, (barring exotic admission
formulas), to educate any significant number of black doctors or lawyers
because of the white in-flight. If blacks can no longer gain admission to
predominantly white schools (without preference being available), and can
no longer gain admission in significant numbers to now predominantly black
schools (because of applications of higher-ranking whites), what has happened to the notion of full and equal citizenship for blacks in American
society? Someone will suggest that blacks, entitled like other citizens to
associational preference, will be allowed to establish predominantly black
private schools. In this day of higher education's dependence on federal
funds, this hypothesis is not beyond criticism. But the fact is that some
racial, ethnic and religious groups are able to, and do, support private
colleges and professional schools with admission preferences. But for the
232.

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).

233.
234.

Id. at 553-555.
See notes 9 and 54 supra.

235.

"The Congress shall have the Power ...

To regulate commerce . . . with the Indian

Tribes."
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most underprivileged of our special groups, the blacks and the Indians, this
is just not realistic. These citizens, if we are talking in significant numbers,
must attend public-supported schools, or not attend at all. Consequentially,
the blacks, at least, would be elbowed out of the professions.
With these by-products, or any of them, in view, the likelihood of the
Supreme Court's clearing the path for Mr. Bakke is mercifully slim. If it
does, the future will be selfish.
(e). Considerations of basic principle concerning the future direction of
the United States, as a polity.
A few United States Supreme Court decisions in each of our centuries
have sounded a theme, or a mood, sometimes admirable, sometimes less so,
that affected the main directions which the country followed for decades
ahead. Is Bakke such a case? Perhaps. Consider the recent reflections of a
successful, black academic lawyer, Professor Derrick A. Bell, Jr. of Harvard Law School:
Constitutional approval of racial segregation which was rendered
obsolete by mid-twentieth century events is now officially condemned. But optimism for the future must be tempered by past experience
and contemporary facts. Racial discrimination, stifled but not stilled
by a generation's worth of civil rights laws and court decisions,
continues to flourish wherever the spur of profit or the fear of loss is
present ...
Measurable improvement in the status of some blacks, and predictions of further progress have not substantially altered the maxim:
white self-interest will prevail over black rights. This unstated, but
firmly followed principle has characterized racial policy in this society for three centuries. Racial policies are still based on the senseno less deeply held when it is unconscious-that America is a white
nation, and that white dominance over blacks is natural, right and
necessary as well as profitable and satisfying. This pervasive belief,
the very essence of racism, remains a viable and valuable national
resource. The commitment to white dominance is no less potent
because it is usually unrecognized, frequently unintended, and virtually never acknowledged.
There is, I suggest, evidence in the past and indications in the
present that the drive of whites to satisfy and justify feelings of
racial superiority will result in policies, private and public, that have
the effect of retaining
dominance over nonwhites for many genera236
tions to come.
The Supreme Court's establishment of a novel constitutional barrier
blocking majoritarian strategies to spur black and other minority participation in crucial social fields would do much to reinforce Professor Bell's
worst fears. One of his predecessors once wrote that the Supreme Court is
236. Bell, Racial Remediation: An Historial Perspective on Current Conditions, 52 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 5,

5-6 (1976).
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predestined in the long run, not only by the thrilling tradition of
Anglo-American law but also by the hard facts of its position in the
structure of American institutions, to be a voice of reason, charged
with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating
and developing impersonal and enduring principles.237
I prefer to cast my hopes with Professor Hart. The result in Bakke will go far
to show which of them is right.
VII.

POSTSCRIPT: FEAR OF STANDING

As suggested earlier, there is a well-founded fear that the Supreme Court
may turn aside, as it did in DeFunis, from this troublesome issue of minority
preferential admissions by reversing on the grounds that Bakke has no
standing. It has long been the rule of the Court that though a plaintiff may
have standing- according to the law of the state from which the case ascends,
the Supreme Court is free to decide this access question according to its own
rules of standing. 238 The Court could well employ its controversial new
standing doctrine 239 to relieve it from reaching the merits.
Minority preference admissions have lost momentum since the Court's
disposition of DeFunis, in 1974, on mootness grounds. Continued uncertainty as to their constitutionality would certainly further erode support for
the program. So realistic is this concern that a reversal on standing grounds
should be considered not as continuing a stalemate, but as delivering a
distinct setback to the concept of preferential minority admissions. In an
article 24 ° that had no great influence in its day, but has since come into its
own, the late Professor Alexander Bickel urged the Court's use of standing,
among other devices, 24 1 as a beneficent means by which the Court could
avoid controversial constitutional decisions. Recent developments in the
Court's cases on standing suggest that a majority of the justices now find
Bickel's notion attractive. The policy reasons for reversal of Bakke, suggested in the last section, stand against such subtle attractiveness. For
escape from responsible decision is no virtue.
The intricacies of the standing labyrinth can be but hinted at here242 -just
237. The late Professor Henry M. Hart Jr., cited in A BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 27 (1962).
238. Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). See Professor Paul Freund's
criticism of Doremus in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 35 (Cahn ed. 1954).
239. As developed principally in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), and Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org'ns., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). But cf. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106
(1976), for a hint of erosion of the five-justice majority that supported Justice Powell's
prevailing opinion in Warth. Cases in the 1976 term shed no further light. See Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) and Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
240. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 40 (1961). But see Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"'--A Comment on
Pinciple and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
241. Such as ripeness, mootness, abstention, and political questions.
242. 1 dealt more fully with the present standing confusion in The Warth Optional Standing
Doctrine: Return to Judicial Supremacy?, 25 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 467-534 (1976).
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enough to indicate the reality of the concern. In Warth v. Seldin,24 3 in 1975,
the Court, by a bare 5-4 majority, accepted an opinion by Justice Powell that
proposed a broad "prudential" power in the Court to dismiss cases for want
of standing, even when the article III requirements had been met. This
notion seemed to be an across-the-board extension of the familiar doctrine
that there is no absolute right of litigants to assert constitutional rights of
third parties (jus tertii), although the Court may permit a litigant in certain
specified situations to do so. 244 The Powell opinion in Warth, a restrictive
zoning case, further specified that a complaint could be dismissed for want
of standing where it does not allege facts "from which it reasonably could
be inferred that, absent the offensive state action, petitioners would have
been able to achieve their objective," and that, "if the court affords the
relief requested, the asserted inability of petitioners will be removed. "245
The plaintiffs in Warth, members of minority groups, had alleged that "as a
result" of respondent's exclusionary scheme, they could not live in Penfield, although they desired and attempted to do so. To four dissenting
justices, this argument seemed adequate to constitute the allegation of a
"personal stake," or "injury-in-fact," which had been the accepted standing formula of the Court for several years. 246 Three of these JusticesBrennan, White and Marshall-argued that "the Court's real holding is not
that these petitioners have not alleged an injury resulting from respondent's
action, but [that] they are not to be allowed to prove one. .

.

.To require

them to allege such facts is to require them to prove their case on paper in
order to get into court at all, reverting to the form of fact-pleading long
abjured in the federal courts.'"247
The controversy continued in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization241 the following term. In this case, individuals and organizations had sued the Secretary of the Treasury to enjoin enforcement of a new
treasury regulation. All the justices agreed that there was ample basis to
dismiss the complaint. The plaintiffs claimed the regulation violated the
Internal Revenue Code by encouraging hospitals to refuse them the charity
treatment that the Code required, as basis for a special tax exemption.
Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed that the claimed injury was not ripe
for adjudication, because it had not effectively alleged, or proved, that the
hospitals in question were affected at all by the challenged regulations.
Writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Powell chose to assume, arguen243.

Supra note 178.

244. For further elaboration of the jus tertii problem, see article cited supra note 242. The
Court fully reconsidered it in Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), without agreeing on
further clarification.
245. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 504.
246. The "personal stake" requirement for Article III standing derived from Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1963). This was further identified as "injury in fact, economic or otherwise"
in Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org'ns, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
247. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 526, 528.
248. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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do, that such allegations had been adequate. He contended, even so, that the
complaint was vulnerable to the want-of-standing doctrine, as developed in
Warth .
In Simon, the Court assumed the plaintiffs had implicitly alleged that a
grant of the requested relief would (1) result in a requirement that all
hospitals serve indigents as a condition to favorable tax treatment, and (2)
"would 'discourage' hospitals from denying their services" to plaintiffs. 249
But this was not enough, wrote Justice Powell, for "it does not follow from
the allegation and its corollary that the denial of access to hospital services
in fact results from the contested new ruling, or that a court-ordered return
by [the government defendants] to their previous policy would result in
these [plaintiffs] receiving the hospital services they desire.' '250
The implications of this conclusion for Bakke, which the Court roots in
article III standing requirements as opposed to "prudential" considerations,
are obvious. The Simon opinion called it "purely speculative whether the
denials of service specified in the complaint fairly can be traced to [the
government defendants'] 'encouragement'
and "equally speculative
whether the desired exercise of the court's remedial powers in this suit
would result in the availability to [plaintiffs] of such services.." 25 1 If this
analysis is insisted upon by the Court, with respect to Bakke's claim, it
would conclude that even by granting Bakke's request to brand the preferential minority admissions program unconstitutional, there is still no assurance
that Bakke, rather than some other non-minority applicants, would actually
receive places in the medical school class. 25 2 The California court apparently recognized this infirmity and sought to circumvent it. Citing the analogy
of certain Title VII discrimination cases, 253 the California opinion (without
hinting of a standing concern) held that when Bakke proved unconstitutional
discrimination, "the burden of proof shifted to the University to establish
that he would not have been admitted to the 1974 or 1975 entering class
without the invalid preferences.' '254
There is some basis for a belief that a majority of the United States
Supreme Court is no longer firmly aligned behind Justice Powell, either
with respect to his general ("prudential," trans-article III) theory, or with
249.

Id. at 42.

250. Id. at 42. (emphasis supplied)
251.

Id. at 42-43.

252. "The trial court found that Bakke would not have been admitted to either the 1973 or
1974 entering class at the University even if there had been no special admissions program."
Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal.3d at 63, 553 P.2d at 1172, 132 Cal.
Rptr. at 700. However, in their petition for rehearing the Regents conceded that they could not

sustain the burden of proving that Bakke would not have been admitted absent the preferential
admissions program. (Record in U.S. Supreme Court, p. 445.)
253. In particular, Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). Oddly, the
California court overlooked Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and the indication that
Title VII decisions did not track determinations on fourteenth amendment equal protection
issues (although it discussed Davis in another connection).
254. Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California, 18 Cal. 3d at 63, 553 P.2d at 1172, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 700 (emphasis added).
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respect to his insistence on detailed factual allegations, and precise proof of
nexus, as a basis for article III standing itself.255
The possibility remains of a "technical" reversal. But one would hope
that the Court does not succumb to the temptation-for the reasons suggested above, as well as the plain absurdity of any analysis of standing that
would deny Bakke access to the courts for the purpose of challenging this
program.
255. Justice Brennan's argument that the Powell approach is "reverting to the form of fact
pleading long abjured in the federal courts" (Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 528; Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org'n, 426 U.S. at 55 n.6) may be winning recruits. At lea,' in
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), only four justices accepted Justice Powell's dissenting
opinion on standing. The majority opinion in Singleton, by Justice Blackmun, treated the case
strictly as involving only the question of assertion of constitutional rights of third parties (jus
tertii, supra note 244), and sought to firm up the factors applicable to that specific concern.
Justice Powell (with three Justices joining him) concurred in the result but, as in Simon, tried to
use the opportunity to reinforce his Warth position. Justice Stevens, concurring, went a long
mile with the majority, but held aloof from alignment with either bloc (Blackmun-BrennanMarshall-White, on the one hand or Powell-Rehnquist-Burger-Stewart, on the other).
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APPENDIX
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL SURVEY, March, 1977
1. Design of SurveyThe NCCU survey expressly builds upon the extensive statistical report
on minority group enrollment data in American law schools by James P.
White, Consultant on Legal Education to the American Bar Association
(MEMORANDUM QS7677-9, dated January 18, 1977, hereinafter called
ABA Report.) This report compiles the minority group student enrollment of
individual law schools for each year from 1971 to 1976 under six specific
minority categories. In addition, it has a valuable compilation table of each
minority group for each year since 1969-70, broken down by year of law
school study.
The NCCU survey referred to the ABA Report and asked a single question: "How many actual minority admittees would probably have qualified
for admission on your general admission standards, if there had been no
preferential admission plan?" Replies were requested for five years, from
1972 to 1976, under four minority headings-Blacks, Hispano-Americans
(including Mexican-American and Puerto Rican), Indian and "other (please
identify)". A final column asked for "Total 1st Year Admissions." The
survey was sent to 131 law schools, the law schools listed in the ABA Report
that had indicated admitting blacks and other minorities, with the exception
of the four predominantly Black law schools. A comparable survey was sent
to 120 medical schools.
2.

Response to NCCU SurveyAs soon as the NCCU Survey was sent out it became apparent that it had
crossed in the mail with the Law School Admissions Council survey asking
substantially the identical question. However, it proved crucial that LSAC
had inquired only with respect to the single year 1976-77. For, unexpectedly
(in face of the competition), there were substantial returns to the NCCU law
school survey. By contrast the NCCU medical school survey returns were
insufficient to justify compilation.
Some early replies to the NCCU law school survey had begged off on
grounds that it "crossed with a similar request from the Law School Admission Council." Others pointed out 'that we have recently sent out a similar
form, but of a more confidential nature" to LSAC. But with the Supreme
Court's grant of an extension for filing briefs the tide turned and the final net
was a 40% response. In the circumstances this compared favorably with the
51.9% response from law schools to the recent Cartter Report on "The
Leading Schools of Education, Law and Business." (See Change, February
1977, pp. 44-48).
Of the 40% replying, 32 percent (43 law schools) furnished data that was
responsive to the questions asked and constitutes the main data upon which
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are based the survey's conclusions. Supplemental connecting data derived
from the ABA Report is explained below.
3.

Reporting Law Schools Constitute a "Fair Sample."
The 40% return, and the 32% data-furnishing response, are highly satisfactory in the circumstances. But since they are considerably less than 100%
completeness one fairly inquires whether those reporting constitute a "fair
sample" of American law schools, so that the conclusions reached may be
taken as representative of the views of American law schools as a whole.
Were it possible to identify the reporting schools by name it would be clear
that these schools constitute a representative cross-section of American
legal education institutions. However the NCCU survey specified that data
would be treated on a confidential basis by law schools requesting confidentiality, and most did. While maintaining the promised confidentiality the
reporting schools may be still adequately placed in reference to the universe
of American law schools by considering three factors: geographical distribution, public or private character, and level of academic repute. The first two
may be dealt with straightaway, the third requires consideration of two
independent studies.
The 43 law schools reporting usable data cover 26 states: 21% from the
New-England-Middle Atlantic area, 22.5% from the South, 37% from the
Middle West, 16% from the Far West (Trans-Rocky Mountains). 44% of
these schools are public, and 56% private. Only one of the 43 reporting
schools said simply: "Don't know."
Moving to the level of academic repute, among the data-furnishing law
schools are five which are ranked among the top 15 American law schools in
the recent Carrter Report (cited above). However a representative sample is
not assured by the mere presence of excellence. To establish the validity of
the sample from the vantage point of the standing of the schools reporting
we refer to the "Law School Locator 1976-77" prepared by the University
of Rochester to "help the student find a set of appropriate law schools,
given that student's grade point average and LSAT score." This study
classifies law schools under 13 headings (A to M). Law Schools with highest
admission requirements are classed in A (LSAT 700+, GPA 3.75-4.00) and B
(LSAT 700+, GPA 3.50-3.74). Succeeding letters represent lower admission
requirements down to M (LSAT 500-549, GPA 2.75-99). Within these letters
A to M, are included 145 law schools. A final category lists 18 "schools with
no information available this year."
For greater simplicity we consolidate the 13 A-to-M headings into five
couplings based on LSAT, and ask how the NCCU reporting schools fall
into these five coupled headings as compared with how the Rochester
universe of 145 law schools fits within the same coupled headings. The
following chart shows how remarkably closely the NCCU distribution
tracks the proportions of the de facto classification based on admission
requirements of the Rochester survey. This correspondence effectively
establishes the validity of NCCU's 43 reporting schools as a "fair sample"
of the American law school universe.
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LSAT

Rochester
Distribution
(145 schools)

A-B
700+ 2*/8
5.5%
C-D
650+ 13/31
21.4%
E-F-G-H
600+ 19/66
45.5%
I-J-K
500+ 8/37
25.5%
L-M
500+ 0/3
2%
* NCCU schools here total 42; the 43rd was unclassified.

NCCU Distribution:
Reporting Schools (43)
4.8%
31%
45.2%
19%
0%

The top line of the above chart expresses that in the combined
categories A and B of the Rochester reportage, law schools require 700+
LSAT for admission. Two of the NCCU reporting schools fit into this
coupling, out of the total of eight schools listed by the Rochester report as
having this requirement. This category A-B includes 5.5% of the 145 schools
constituting the Rochester classifiable universe. The category also constitutes 4.8% of the reporting schools in the NCCU survey. A comparable
correspondence is seen in the largest category, E-F-G-H. The other
categories are less identical in correspondence, but still remarkable. (The
"unclassified" schools in the Rochester report are 18; one of the NCCU
schools is on this list. This factor has been left out of the above computations as not significant.) See Chart III, infra, for correction of NCCU
sample for lower participations of reporting schools.
4.

Supporting Data from ABA ReportSome reporting schools did, and some did not, list the total Black admissions in each given year. When they did there was no need to look elsewhere. Where they did not, the data were supplied from the ABA report, by
averaging the minority total attendance figures for three years, dividing by
three to secure a 1-year factor, and adding 20%. This 20% factor is justified
by conclusive data in Table A of the ABA report, which shows a decline of
20% from Black 1st year enrollment to Black attendance in 2nd and 3rd year
of law school. Incidentally, this is not simply a reflection of academic
deficiency. As one reporting school pointed out, "We experience a significant amount of attrition among Black students who are very well qualified
for us but who are affirmatively acted upon at other schools." Other schools
commented on other grounds for the attrition. The point must be stressed
that all candidates admitted, by general or by special minority admission
programs, are certified as qualified to aspire to professional work in a
particular school, by the specialists on the scene who are best qualified to
make that judgment. To date most law schools have made their admissions
choices within the two-track system of general admissions (LSAT-GPA, see
discussion of Rochester Locator, supra) and special minority admissions.
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Chart II (Summary Form)
Effect of Elimination of Special Minority Admissions:
Hypothetical vs Actual Black Law School Enrollment,
1974-1976
1976-77
78/697
11.19%
(41 Schools)

Three-Year Period
(1974-76)
171/1383
12.36%
(31 Schools)

Interpretation: In 1976-77 if special minority admissions programs
were not used (but the prevailing variations of LSAT-GPA ratings), instead
of the 697 Black students actually enrolled in the 1st year class in the 41 law
schools covered by these computations, there would have been only 78
Black law students enrolled. This constitutes but 11.19% of those Black
students actually enrolled in 1st year law classes that year in those schools
(The Three-Year Total comes to 12.36% in 31 law schools.)

Chart II
3 yrs (1974-77)

1976-77
I.
2.
0/15
3.
1/22
4.
0/40
5.
3/9
6. 12/12
7.
0/12
8.
1/5
9.
2/17
10. 4/11
11.
2/22
12.
0/69
13.
1/48
1/39
14.
15.
3/11
16. 0/2
17.
0/22
18.
1/11
19.
0/4
1/3
20.
21.
0/8
22.
0/8
23.
0/7
30.
2/15
*
**

4/55
4/66
2/121
4/26
33/36
0/35
4/15
5/52
12/34
5/50

8/34
0/6
0/70
3/15
1/9

1976-77

3 yrs (1974-77)

0/17
31.
32.
1/11
33.
0/17
0/14
34.
35.
0/2
42. 0/13
43.
4/11
44. 21/45
45.
0/13
46. 2/16
48.
i/15
51.
2/2
52.
0/34
i/7
53.
54. 3/8
55.
1/32
56.
57.
8/17
58.
0/11

0/51
1/36
2/52
0/41
0/5
2/39

78/697
2/35
0/22
5/43

11. 19%
41 schools**

62/134
1/44
3/4
1/102
1/21
5/96

1/34
171/1383
12.36%
31 schools

For interpretation see Chart II (Summary Form).
For evaluation of sample see Appendix, p. 4, and for correction of sample see Chart III,

infra.
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187

Chart III
Correction of Sample for Lower Participations (See 3, above)

A-B
C-D
E-F-G-H
I-J-K
L-M

Rochester
(145 schools)

1976-77
(41)

1975-76
(35)

1974-75
(34)

1973-74
(28)

1972-73
(22)

5.5%
21.4%
45.5%
25.5%
2%

4.9%
31.7%
46.3%
17.1%
0

2.9%
34.3%
45.7%
17.1%
0

2.9%
35.3%
44.1%
17.7%
0

0
35.7%
46.4%
17.9%
0

0
31.8%
54.6%
13.6%
0

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1977

65

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1977], Art. 2

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol8/iss2/2

66

